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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis aims to show that Martin Heidegger‟s notion of fundamental ontology 
can serve as the foundation for a new approach to environmental ethics. The thesis 
begins with a brief introduction to the traditional approaches of environmental thought 
and a description of how Heidegger‟s interpretation of human existence as Dasein 
provides a new perspective from which to approach questions of the fitting relation 
between human beings and the nonhuman world. While traditional environmental 
thought approaches nature primarily as the object of modern science and technology, 
Heidegger‟s thought allows nature to become meaningful for human beings as an 
important part of their everyday lives. The first chapter begins with an examination of 
the wilderness and environmental justice debates and argues that Anglo-American 
environmental thought has yet to understand and define the natural environment in a way 
that encompasses the needs of both human and nonhuman life. Heidegger‟s existential 
analytic of Dasein describes human existence in a way that demonstrates its 
interconnectedness with the nonhuman world and can be used to rethink the fitting place 
of human existence within the natural environment. The second chapter demonstrates 
that Heidegger‟s critique of the metaphysical foundations of modern science and 
technology clears the way for a renewed understanding of the interconnectedness of 
human and nonhuman life. Heidegger‟s critique demonstrates that an authentic 
understanding of human existence necessarily entails a new approach to interpreting 
being. The final chapter of the thesis analyses Heidegger‟s retrieval of the early Greek 
 iii 
 
understanding of being as phusis together with Heidegger‟s notion of poetic dwelling in 
order to provide a new perspective for interpreting the scope of a fitting relation between 
human beings and natural environment. Heidegger‟s thought demonstrates that the 
natural environment must be understood as an essential condition of human existence 
and can thereby allow human beings to interpret the nonhuman world in a way that 
would encompass the needs of both human and nonhuman life.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
According to J. Baird Callicott, environmental philosophy emerged in the early 
1970s among different groups with different methods and interests and eventually 
became a unified field in the early 1980s when the academic journal, Environmental 
Ethics, was founded and allowed environmental thinkers to come together as a 
community.
1
 The first group that emerged understood environmental philosophy as a 
new form of applied ethics and aimed to extend classic ethical theories to new problems 
presented by modern technology. This group oriented itself mainly by tackling specific 
environmental concerns such as the emergence of acid rain and the implications of 
nuclear power. A second group coalesced in response to this approach and felt that the 
overly specialized topics of the first would prevent the development of an environmental 
sensibility. This group attempted “to extend conventional Western moral theory so that it 
would include nonhuman beings among the direct beneficiaries of ethics.”2 According to 
Callicott, this approach works best within the realm of animal rights, and has been 
adopted mainly by the animal liberation movement. The debates of the third group that 
emerged have become central to environmental philosophy today. This third approach 
takes two distinct forms. There are those who argue that an environmental ethic can only 
be developed within an anthropocentric framework, and those, like Callicott, who argue 
                                                 
1
 J. Baird Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: State University of New York Publishers, 
1989), 2. 
2
 Ibid.  
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that an environmental ethic must be decidedly biocentric. According to Callicott, 
anthropocentric environmentalism “confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards 
all other things, including forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable…to the 
extent that they are means or instruments which may serve human beings.”3 This 
approach seeks to reform resource management, wildlife management, and many 
practices surrounding modern technology in a way that would mitigate environmental 
degradation but sees no need to critically reassess contemporary values in order to 
address environmental concerns. Biocentric environmentalism takes a fundamentally 
different approach and seeks to “shift the locus of intrinsic value from individuals 
(whether human beings or higher „lower animals‟) to terrestrial nature.”4 Callicott 
explains that this perspective calls for a critique of traditional values and aims to 
construct new metaphysical and moral paradigms in which to establish the intrinsic 
value of the nonhuman world.  
 The debate between biocentric and anthropocentric environmentalist underlies 
the majority of environmental discourses today and its continued existence demonstrates 
that the Anglo-American tradition in which environmental thought first emerged has yet 
to define nature in a way that encompasses the needs of both human and nonhuman life. 
Since its inception in the early 1970s, environmental philosophy has been approached 
predominately within the analytic school of thought and depends on conceptions of 
nature that have been largely defined by ecology and the other natural sciences. 
                                                 
3
 J. Baird Callicott, “Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984), 1. 
4
 Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic, 3. 
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However, as the ability of the natural environment to continue supporting the current 
trajectory of modern civilization continues to become increasingly in doubt, 
environmental debates have become more mainstream in academic philosophy and are 
now approached from a variety of perspectives including that of continental philosophy 
and phenomenology.  
  In the introduction to Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself, Charles S. 
Brown and Ted Toadvine argue that the continental approach to environmental thought 
can augment the traditional science-based and analytic approaches by taking its cue from 
the famous rallying cry of Edmund Husserl: “To the things themselves!”5 Although the 
natural sciences have brought attention to the current “environmental crisis” and need 
for reflection on the relationship between the human and nonhuman world, according to 
Brown, Toadvine, Bruce Foltz, Robert Frodeman, and countless others, an effective 
response must begin with an analysis of how we understand, relate to, and value nature 
in the sphere of our practical experience.
6
 According to Brown and Toadvine, if we rely 
on science alone to define our relation to the nonhuman world, we will be left with “an 
unrecognizable abstraction, and certainly not with any version of nature that could have 
inspired our initial appreciation.”7 Not only has the traditional approach to 
environmental thought overlooked the values that emerge from our everyday experience 
of the natural environment, according to Monica Langer, the traditional approach to 
                                                 
5
 Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine, “Eco-Phenomenology: An Introduction,” in Eco-Phenomenology: 
Back to the Earth Itself, ed. Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2003), xi. 
6
 For a discussion of the various interpretations and approaches to the “environmental crisis” see Bruce V. 
Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature (Amherst: 
Humanity Books, 1995), 3.  
7
 Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine, “Eco-Phenomenology: An Introduction,” xi. 
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environmental thought (including both the anthropocentric and biocentric perspectives) 
has conceptualized nature within an “ontological dualism” that sets up a false dichotomy 
between the human and nonhuman world and contributes to the urge to master and 
control the world around us.
8
  
 Martin Heidegger‟s phenomenological analysis of human existence can 
contribute to environmental philosophy by overcoming the dualistic ontologies that have 
precluded the development of an understanding of nature that would encompass the 
needs of both human beings and the nonhuman world. According to Thomas Sheehan, 
approaching ontology from the question of the “meaning of being” rather than being 
alone separates Heidegger‟s approach from the history of ontology which preceded it.9 
For Heidegger, overcoming the problematic approach to ontology that has characterized 
Western thought thus far must begin with an examination of our own human existence, 
which Heidegger understands as the fundamental ground and origin of the meaning of 
being. Heidegger‟s deconstruction of the history of Western metaphysics demonstrates 
that we will continue to struggle to define the fitting place for human beings in the 
natural world until we have come to a fuller understanding of what it means to be 
human. For Heidegger, the most essential characteristic of human existence lies in our 
fundamental relation to being which occurs in our everyday interactions with the world 
around us, and is the source of the world of human existence. According to Sheehan, for 
Heidegger, “the ultimate source of the world is the ontological movement of human 
                                                 
8
 Monika Langer, “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty: Some of their Contributions and Limitations 
for Environmentalism,” in Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself, ed. Charles S. Brown and Ted 
Toadvine (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 105. 
9
 Thomas Sheehan, “Dasein,” in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007), 193. 
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being…in short, is Dasein.”10 Heidegger uses the term Dasein to describe the essential 
relatedness of being and human existence and explains that ontology must begin with an 
understanding of the interconnectedness of Dasein and the world human beings find 
themselves in.  
In characterizing human existence as Dasein, Heidegger‟s thought has the 
potential to restore our understanding of the fitting place of human beings within nature 
in two ways. First, Heidegger‟s characterization of human existence as Dasein can clear 
the way for a fuller understanding of the interconnectedness and interdependence of the 
human and nonhuman world. Secondly, Heidegger‟s critique of Western metaphysics 
and modern technology re-contextualizes our understanding of nature within the sphere 
of our practical experience and thereby has the potential to promote the development of 
authentic environmental concern. Heidegger understands modern technology as the 
defining mark of our relationship with being and the world around us. Therefore, his 
critique of modern technology and the theoretical attitude of modern science is yet 
another way in which Heidegger aims to elucidate and restore our understanding of our 
own human existence.  
Chapter two begins with an analysis of how the traditional attempts of Anglo-
American philosophy to define nature and have failed to encompass the needs of the 
human and nonhuman world. The environmental justice and wilderness debates 
demonstrate that the convention of interpreting nature primarily from the perspective of 
modern science has prevented us from encountering nature as a meaningful aspect of our 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 202. 
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everyday lives and has contributed to an antagonistic understanding of our relation to 
and dependence on the natural environment. Next, Heidegger‟s characterization of 
human existence as Dasein will be shown to provide the ground for a new understanding 
of nature, ethics, and the fitting place for human existence within the nonhuman world. 
For Heidegger, our ability to relate ethically to the world around us depends our ability 
to restore the essential relation to being that characterizes and determines our existence. 
According to Heidegger, this relation begins in thought and unfolds in language in a way 
that allows the world to become meaningful for human existence. Understanding our 
relation to being as it unfolds in language would bring us into the ethical relation to 
beings and the world around us which Heidegger describes in his later work as „poetic 
dwelling.‟ Poetic dwelling requires that human beings come to understand the essential 
relation to being that defines them as the “shepherds of being,” rather than the lords and 
masters of all they encounter.
11
   
In order to restore our essential relation to being, we must come not only to a 
fuller understanding of our own existence, but also of being itself. Thus, the next two 
chapters are devoted to an examination of Heidegger‟s critique of Western metaphysics, 
which consist of an examination of the origin and development of our contemporary 
understanding of being as „constant presence.‟ Heidegger‟s critique of Western 
metaphysics aims to restore our understanding of being in two ways. First, chapter three 
examines Heidegger‟s critique of modern science and technology. Heidegger‟s 
                                                 
11
 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 304.  
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examination of the essence of modern science and technology seeks deconstruct the 
contemporary understanding of being as constant presence which has alienated us from 
our essential relation to being and has also brought us into the era of environmental 
crisis. Heidegger‟s deconstruction of offers insight into how our current understanding 
of science and technology have fundamentally constricted our ability to relate to the 
nonhuman world, and simultaneously seeks to restore our essential relation to modern 
technology. Heidegger‟s analysis demonstrates that if we understand modern technology 
as a form of poiesis, we can come into a „free relation‟ with it that would allow us to 
better cooperate with the nonhuman world. However, understanding our relation to 
technology in this way depends on our ability to fully understand our essential relation to 
being, and subsequently a renewed understanding of being itself.  
Chapter four examines the second task of Heidegger‟s critique of Western 
metaphysics which aims at providing an alternative understanding of being that would 
allow us to more fully understand human existence. In order to do so, Heidegger‟s 
critique of Western metaphysics reaches back to the origins of Western thought in early 
Greek philosophy in order to retrieve and revive the Heraclitean characterization of 
being as phusis, logos, and aletheia. For Heidegger, understanding being in this way 
would allow us to grant the beings we encounter their independence beyond their ability 
to conform to the framework of modern technology and would allow us to encounter 
them as “things” rather than simply as the objects of modern science and technology. 
Interpreting beings in a way that grants them their independence and self-standing brings 
us into a relation with being which Heidegger describes as „poetic dwelling.‟ 
 8 
 
According to Foltz, Heidegger‟s notion of poetic dwelling “constitutes the 
possibility for a genuine environmental ethic.”12 In his writings on poetic dwelling, 
Heidegger describes an alternative attunement to being that shifts the sphere of our 
understanding human existence and the world from the sphere of modern science and 
technology to the sphere of our everyday experience. In elucidating the defining 
character of the everyday involvement of human beings with the world around them, 
Heidegger‟s thought has the potential to make the nonhuman world meaningful for 
human beings as an essential part of their everyday lives and as a defining condition of 
human existence. Thus, in re-contextualizing human existence within the sphere of 
practical experience, Heidegger‟s thought has the potential to promote the development 
of genuine environmental concern. Heidegger tells us “thinking changes the world.”13 
Thus, the foundation for a sound environmental ethic must be sought not only through 
the scientific appraisal of the effects of our actions on the nonhuman world, but also 
through close consideration of the interdependence of the human and nonhuman world. 
                                                 
12
 Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature, 173. 
13
 Martin Heidegger, “Logos (Heraclitus Fragment B 50),” in Early Greek Thinking, trans. David Farrell 
Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. (New York: Harper and Row. 1984), 78. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A HEIDEGGERIAN RESPONSE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DEBATE 
 
Introduction 
 
In the introduction to Rethinking Nature, Foltz and Robert Frodeman offer a brief 
analysis of the potential contributions of continental philosophy to environmental 
thought. According to Foltz and Frodeman, awareness of the need for reflection on the 
impacts of “modern, industrialized society” on the natural environment first arose not in 
the arena of academic philosophy but as a response to findings of the natural sciences. 
They argue that although our understanding of the processes inherent in nature has 
drastically changed “from homeostasis and climax to chaos and patchwork, our 
environmental imperatives remain grounded in a scientifically established understanding 
of the environment.”14 Thus, modern science has defined not only the problems 
considered in the field of environmental ethics today, but also its vocabulary. Topics 
such as „biodiversity,‟ „ecosystem,‟ and „environment,‟ all have been defined by the 
science of ecology. Heidegger, in his writings on modern science and technology, argues 
that even our understanding of the historically ambiguous term „nature‟ has become 
understood predominately as the object of the natural sciences.
15
  
                                                 
14
 Bruce V. Foltz and Robert Frodeman, “The Nature of Environmental Philosophy,” in Rethinking 
Nature, ed. Bruce V. Foltz and Robert Frodeman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 4. 
15
 Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, ed. J. Glenn Gray and Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1977). 
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Although the scientific account of nature has dominated our attempts to 
understand the natural environment thus far, ongoing debates between those who 
consider themselves „environmentalists‟ and those who describe themselves as 
proponents of „environmental justice‟ demonstrate that we have yet to define our 
environment in a way that would encompass the needs of human and nonhuman life. 
Heidegger‟s critique of Western metaphysics has the potential to contribute to 
environmental philosophy by allowing us to examine our relation to the nonhuman 
world from a new perspective. For Heidegger, questions about our natural environment, 
ethics, and what it means to a human being all depend on his notion of fundamental 
ontology. Although an examination of the terms „nature,‟ „environment,‟ and „ethics‟ 
from this perspective may initially seem even more abstract than the insights offered by 
modern science, a Heideggerian analysis of the history of these terms has the possibility 
to resituate our approach to environmental ethics within the sphere of our practical 
experience. Rather than developing a theory of moral obligation, Heidegger seeks to 
recast our notion of ethics as the dwelling place, or proper abode, of human beings 
through a retrieval of the early Greek notion of ēthos. For Heidegger, an understanding 
of the proper abode of human beings requires that we first reexamine what it means to be 
human and how it is that we come to understand the world around us through our 
practical experience. By grounding his notion of ethics within the sphere of fundamental 
ontology, Heidegger‟s philosophy demonstrates that our understanding of both ethics 
and nature has its origins in our understanding of what it means to be a human being.  
 11 
 
The following analysis will begin with an examination of how the concepts of 
nature and wilderness have been central points of contention in the environmental justice 
debate. This debate illustrates the continued inability of Anglo-American environmental 
thought to understand and define the natural environment in a way that would 
encompass the needs of both human and nonhuman life. In his writings on the 
environmental justice and wilderness debates, William Cronon suggests that in order to 
fully understand the natural environment and the basis of a fitting human relation to it 
we must first realize that our definitions of nature are value laden, cultural constructs. He 
claims that a humanistic approach to understanding the natural environment would allow 
environmental ethicists to begin defining terms such as „nature‟ and „wilderness‟ in a 
way that encompasses the needs of human and nonhuman life. Although Heidegger 
argued that humanism is indicative of our inability to fully understand human existence 
and our relation to the world around us, his phenomenological description of human 
existence as Dasein has the potential to allow us to renegotiate our place within the 
nonhuman world in the way that Cronon suggests. Heidegger‟s characterization of 
human existence as Dasein demonstrates the essential interdependence of human and 
nonhuman life in a way that would allow us to completely rethink the foundations of 
environmental ethics and can contribute to the development of authentic environmental 
concern. 
The Environmental Justice Debate 
 
In the essay, “Revisiting the Environmental Justice Debate,” Phaedra C. Pezzullo 
and Ronald Sandler, explain that although the environmental movement and the 
 12 
 
environmental justice movement seem like natural allies, their relationship “has been 
characterized as one of division, and even hostility, rather than one of cooperation.”16 
Since the inception of the environmental justice movement in the early 1990s, its 
proponents have criticized what they consider mainstream environmentalism as classist, 
elitist, racist, and short sighted. According to Pezzullo and Sandler, the First National 
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit (Summit I) and the letters that were 
sent to „The Group of Ten‟ in the early 1990s continue to define the relationship between 
these two movements and the scholarship regarding the challenges of environmental 
justice to environmentalism. „The Group of Ten‟ was a nickname for the group of ten 
environmental organizations that met regularly during this time in order to respond to the 
backlash against environmentalism.
17
 On January 16, 1990 these organizations received 
a letter from the Gulf Coast Tenant Leadership Development project claiming that the 
“racism and whiteness of the environmental movement” has become its “Achilles 
heel.”18 Two months later the Southwest Organizing Project sent a letter signed by 103 
members calling for “frank and open dialogue” regarding the “lack of accountability” of 
the group for “third world communities in the southwest, in the United States as a whole, 
and internationally.”19 This second letter claimed that The Group of Ten had failed to 
consider how their agenda would effect “working people in general and people of color 
                                                 
16
 Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C. Pezzullo, “Revisiting the Environmental Justice Challenge to 
Environmentalism,” in Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to 
Environmentalism, ed. Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C. Pezzullo (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 2. 
17
 The Group of Ten included: The Audubon Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, 
Izaak Walton League, National Parks and Conservation Association, National Wildlife Federation, Natural 
Resource Defense Council, Sierra Club, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, and the Wilderness society.  
18
 Sandler and Pezzullo, “Revisiting the Environmental Justice Challenge to Environmentalism,” 3. 
19
 Ibid. 
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in particular,” and asked that environmental groups examine their own culpability “in 
patterns of environmental racism, and undemocratic processes, including [their] 
lobbying agenda, political platforms, financial backers, organizing practices, and 
representations of Third World Communities within the United States and abroad.”20 
Together, these letters expressed concern that the environmental movement‟s efforts to 
preserve endangered species and wilderness areas had overlooked and undermined the 
needs of human beings within their actual, urban environments.   
These events succeeded in gaining the attention of the press, and in the following 
year the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit was held in 
Washington, D.C. This summit culminated in the adoption of the “Principles of 
Environmental Justice” which, according to Pezzullo and Sandler, “has become the 
defining document of the environmental justice movement.”21 These seventeen 
principles sought to expand the predominant understanding of environmental issues in a 
way that situates questions of environmental concern directly within the sphere of social 
justice. Together, the principles “emphasize that the environmental justice movement is 
not only an effort for racial justice; it is a movement for justice for „all peoples.‟”22 
Summit I also dedicated a session to the relationship between the environmental 
justice movement and environmental organizations, entitled “Our Vision of the Future: 
A Redefinition of Environmentalism,” moderated by Benjamin F. Chavis Jr. Speakers of 
this session included African American, Latin American, Asian American, and Native 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid., 5.  
22
 Ibid.  
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American representatives, as well as environmental leaders, John H. Adams, the 
executive director of the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Michael Fischer, 
Executive Director of the Sierra Club. According to Pezzullo and Sandler, although 
“both environmental leaders noted that their organizations had done previous work on 
pollution and public health campaigns,” they were unable to align their agenda with the 
emerging discourse of the summit.
23
 Instead, both leaders expressed a desire to forge 
alliances within the environmental justice movement.  
These historic events sparked a proliferation of academic literature attempting to 
examine and respond to the challenges that had been posed to the environmental 
movement. The literature focused on themes of racism, classism, and sexism, as well as 
conceptual and rhetorical differences. Together, Summit I and the letters that were sent 
to The Group of Ten indicated “the primary impetus for the environmental justice 
movement‟s criticisms was the failure of the environmental movement to make racism a 
priority, internally or externally.”24 After Summit I, environmental justice activists 
continued to feel unable to articulate their agenda within the discourse of the 
environmental movement. Although there had been awareness of and concern for issues 
of pollution and public health since the early 1960s, environmental justice leaders felt 
that the Group of Ten‟s focus on the preservation of wilderness and endangered species 
left little room for their concerns. According to Givoanna Di Chiro, in the months 
following Summit I, environmental justice activists became increasingly frustrated with 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., 6.  
24
 Ibid., 7.  
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the inability of the environmental movement to address their concerns.
25
 This led Dana 
Alston, senior program officer of the Panos Institute in Washington, and other prominent 
figures of the environmental justice movement to begin emphasizing independence from 
the environmental movement. In We Speak for Ourselves, Alston argued that 
environmental justice “calls for a total redefinition of terms and language to describe the 
conditions that people are facing.”26 
Deehon Ferris and other activists quickly followed Alston‟s lead as 
environmental justice literature worked to reinvent the term „environment.‟ In this new 
discourse, the environmental justice movement drew on the legacy of the civil rights 
movement in order to “inextricably link social justice with the environment.”27 However, 
this broadened conception of „environment‟ immediately raised concern among 
environmentalists that the “already marginalized concerns for animals and wilderness 
would be placed even further on the back burner by this seemingly more anthropocentric 
set of values and terms.”28 
This distinctly anthropocentric redefinition of the term „environment‟ may be 
seen to continue to characterize the literature and agenda of the environmental justice 
movement today. In a special issue of Environmental Politics dedicated to the 21
st
 
anniversary of the environmental justice movement, David Schlosberg celebrates the 
accomplishments of the environmental justice movement, recognizing the way it has 
striven to redefine our understanding of the environment and the fact that this new 
                                                 
25
Ibid., 10.  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Ibid., 11.  
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understanding is being applied to a broader range of issues both nationally and globally. 
Schlosberg writes:  
The expanding sphere of the environmental justice discourse has…been extended 
further with the application of the frame to climate change and climate justice, as 
well as growing concerns and movements around local food and energy that have 
become the center of some environmental justice organizing. Climate change has 
pushed environmental justice to more broad considerations of both environment 
and justice.
29
 
 
However, while Schlosberg‟s analysis of these new potential frontiers of environmental 
justice aims at putting the nonhuman environment back into the concerns of the 
environmental justice movement, his take on this potential expansion remains decidedly 
anthropocentric. For Schlosberg, an expansion of the term „environment‟ simply means 
acknowledging the fact that the nonhuman environment itself must be understood as a 
part of our “basic material needs.”30 Although the field of climate ethics itself is not 
completely dominated by an anthropocentric conception of the environment, Schlosberg 
sees debates about climate change and the stability of food and energy sources as the 
potential impetus for a “sustainable materialist” conception of the environment.31 
 Schlossberg‟s analysis demonstrates that the environmental justice movement 
today still struggles to define the term „environment‟ in a way that would encompass the 
needs of both human and nonhuman communities. William Cronon‟s analysis of the 
social embeddedness of our understanding of both „nature‟ and „wilderness‟ sheds light 
on how our contemporary understanding of the key terms of both the environmental 
movement and the environmental justice movement are inherently divisive and have 
                                                 
29
 David Schlosberg, “Theorizing Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse,” 
Environmental Politics 22, no.1 (2013), 38. 
30
 Ibid., 49.  
31
 Ibid., 51. 
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prevented both sides of the environmental justice debate from developing an adequate 
understanding of the fitting place of human beings within nature. Much like Foltz and 
Frodeman, in the introduction to Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human place in 
Nature, Cronon claims that the environmental movement has come to view nature as a 
“stable external source of nonhuman values against which human actions can be judged 
without much ambiguity.”32 Although we have come to think of nature as a nonhuman 
realm which is not of our own making, Cronon argues that the key to uncovering a more 
practical understanding of nature will require that we come to realize that all of our 
definitions and conceptualizations of nature are “cultural constructions that reflect 
human judgments, human values, [and] human choices.”33  
Cronon traces the divisive character of the term „nature‟ back to what he 
describes as its most fundamental meaning in the English language. When we speak of 
the nature of the objects and entities we discover in the world, we seek to describe their 
most fundamental essence. Thus the term nature is bound up with an understanding of 
ultimate reality, all that truly is. According to Cronon, this understanding of nature as 
„naïve reality‟ is ultimately bound up with our understanding of nature as „moral 
imperative.‟ This link means that “one need not travel a very great distance in speaking 
of „the nature of x‟ to get from „this is the way x really is’ to „this is the way x ought to 
be.‟”34 Thus, as each group of people in its own social context projects its unique set of 
values onto nature, the fundamental interpretation of nature as naïve reality leads us to 
                                                 
32
 William Cronon, “In Search of Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, 
ed. William Cronon (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 26. 
33
 Ibid., 34. 
34
 Ibid., 36. 
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assert dogmatized and unreflective notions of nature. In consequence, the desire to 
define nature in terms of ultimate reality promotes an artificial sedimentation of our 
values, which precludes the possibility of constructive dialogue among different groups 
of people and prevents us from reflecting on how our own values have influenced our 
understanding of and relation to nature.  
For Cronon, the greatest danger that arises from understanding nature as another 
term for reality lies in the potential of this paradigm to set up idealized notions of nature 
that ultimately alienate human beings from the natural environment and promote 
environmentalist agendas that marginalize concerns for environmental justice. In his 
famous and controversial essay, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the 
Wrong Nature,” Cronon explains that our contemporary understanding of wilderness 
creates a false dichotomy between the human and nonhuman world that fails to leave 
room for authentic human inhabitation of nature, prevents the development of a 
sustainable ethic of responsible use, and ultimately contributes to the environmental 
justice backlash against environmentalism. According to Cronon, the American ideal of 
wilderness ultimately stems from early Protestant notions of sublime nature and the 
American frontier myth. Our conception of wilderness is a uniquely American value 
which, when exported abroad, has the potential to become “an unthinking and self-
defeating form of cultural imperialism”35 Cronon warns, for “first world 
environmentalists” saving the rainforest often means saving it from the people who live 
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there and that this type of environmentalism runs “the risk of reproducing the same 
tragedy…that befell American Indians.”36 
According to Cronon, in conceptualizing wilderness as the ideal form of nature, 
American environmentalists leave “little hope of discovering what an ethical, 
sustainable, honorable human place in nature might actually look like.”37 He urges that 
we must determine a middle ground between responsible use and nonuse, for it is 
between the extremes created by the idealization of wilderness that human beings 
actually live and make their homes. Cronon warns that the only way to discover this 
middle ground is to remember that human beings are not separate from nature but rather, 
“are part of the natural world, [and] inextricably tied to the ecological systems that 
sustain their lives.”38 For Cronon, this means keeping sight of the cultural influences on 
our conceptions of both nature and wilderness. In a lecture delivered in 1999 entitled 
“Humanist Environmentalism: A Manifesto,” Cronon reminds us that “the nature we 
carry around in our heads is as important as the nature that is all around us, because in 
fact the nature inside our heads is often the engine which drives our interactions with 
physical nature.”39 
Cronon‟s examination of the implications of the American notion of wilderness 
remains controversial and has become associated with the environmental justice 
backlash against environmentalism. According to Kevin DeLuca, Cronon‟s now 
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infamous essays and lectures on wilderness have inadvertently sparked a proliferation of 
literature claiming that because wilderness has been shown to be a human construct, it 
no longer makes sense to attempt to preserve it. In his essay, “A Wilderness 
Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans,” 
DeLuca argues that the notion of wilderness is a “crucial rhetorical trope in 
environmental battles and an a priori reality that makes the human possible.”40 DeLuca 
explains that Cronon has been fundamentally misunderstood, and he reminds us that 
Cronon does not call for an abandonment of wilderness but for a renewed, fluid 
understanding of the notion of wilderness that would allow human beings to continue 
conceptually exploring and negotiating their authentic place in nature.  
In response to those who attempt to use Cronon‟s work to argue that the cultural 
embeddedness of the American notion of wilderness serves as grounds for its 
abandonment in environmentalism, DeLuca responds, “Wilderness is a fiction. Your 
point?”41 He argues that Cronon‟s work does not uncover a need to abandon the 
preservation of wilderness and endangered species in the name of more anthropocentric 
environmental agendas, but rather calls for a reexamination of how the term „wilderness‟ 
can help us rethink our relationship to the nonhuman world. DeLuca suggests that the 
necessity of the term wilderness lies in its ability to provoke us to think about nonhuman 
nature beyond the needs and purposes of human endeavors and reminds us that the 
nonhuman world has a right to continued existence. For him, wilderness can serve this 
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purpose if we rethink it as “the excess and otherness that grounds and surrounds us, 
putting us in our place.”42 
According to Cronon, interpreting nature from the perspective of humanism 
would open up a deeper understanding of our conception of nature and how that 
understanding has influenced our response to the nonhuman world. Cronon describes 
humanism as a school of thought that understands the social practices, values, and ideas 
of a group of people to be intrinsically linked to their geographic, cultural, and historical 
context. He urges, “if we hope for an environmentalism capable of explaining why 
people use and abuse the earth as they do, then the nature we study must become less 
natural and more cultural.”43 For Cronon, a humanist meditation on the meaning of the 
terms „wilderness,‟ „nature,‟ „environment,‟ and other similar terms implemented in 
environmental discourse would allow us to more fully understand the interconnectedness 
of the human and nonhuman world.  
Heidegger‟s fundamental ontology, presented as the existential analytic of 
Dasein in Being and Time and further elaborated in his “Letter on Humanism,” can serve 
as an important point of departure for reexamining our notions of nature in the way that 
Cronon prescribes. Heidegger‟s “Letter on Humanism” may be seen to answer many of 
the questions that Cronon raises. In this famous essay, Heidegger asks what it means to 
be a human being, how we can come to understand our essential place in the world, and 
how these questions relate to our notions of ethics. Heidegger examines these questions 
by responding to the question, “How can we restore meaning to the word 
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„humanism‟?”44 However, for Heidegger, our received idea of this term does not hold 
the key to answering these fundamental questions. Rather, Heidegger argues that the 
question of human existence must be approached outside of Western metaphysics, which 
includes all of our traditional notions of humanism.  For Heidegger, a deeper 
understanding of human existence and its interdependence with the world should 
concern itself primarily with “the dimension in which the essence of man, determined by 
being itself is at home.”45 Heidegger explains that an understanding of this home, or 
ēthos, requires that we come to understand ourselves as the “shepherds of being.”46 
Heidegger‟s Originary Ethics 
For Heidegger, the term „humanism‟ itself is problematic because it is an 
example of the metaphysical tendency to use predetermined concepts to interpret things 
and others. Much like Cronon, Heidegger believes that the truisms we use to try to 
understand the essence of the world around us only yield a calcified and incomplete 
understanding of the phenomena they seek to describe and prevent the necessary, on-
going negotiation of our place in existence and subsequently in nature. For Heidegger, 
our contemporary understanding of humanism is no exception.  
Throughout the history of Western metaphysics, beginning with ancient Greece 
and Rome, human beings have sought to set up in advance a definition of human essence 
that could be used instrumentally to measure the value of our actions. However, the 
traditional approaches to humanism, whether based in Greek, Roman, Christian, or 
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enlightenment thought, have yet to comprehend the full dignity of human beings. 
Heidegger argues that our dignity depends on the way we come to understand ourselves 
in relation to others and lies in the essence of human beings understood as Dasein. In 
addition, Heidegger tells us that actions cannot be measured instrumentally because to 
act means more than to merely cause an effect. Rather, “the essence of action is 
accomplishment.”47  
Heidegger‟s understanding of the essence of action stems from his understanding 
of human beings as Dasein, which he sometimes also describes as ek-sistence. 
Heidegger uses these terms to define the essence of human beings as a dynamic 
unfolding that occurs through our meaningful relations with things and others. Dasein is 
often translated as „being-there,‟ and according to Jean-Luc Nancy this term should be 
understood verbally as “being the there,” as being the open region for the unfolding of 
being.
48
 For Heidegger, the term Dasein articulates an active interconnectedness of being 
and the humanity of human beings. Thus, in examining the implications of the term 
humanism, Heidegger seeks to establish that the existential analytic of Dasein presented 
in Being and Time demonstrates that ethics cannot simply be derived from ontology, but 
must rather be understood as ontological.  
According to Sheehan, if we wish to understand how and why Heidegger 
describes human beings as Dasein, it is important to first note that in Being and Time, 
Heidegger does not approach ontology from the traditional standpoint, but rather takes 
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his point of departure from the question of the meaning of being. This question examines 
how being, and subsequently the world we live in, becomes meaningful for human 
beings through their involvement in the context of their meaningful relations. This 
unique approach allows Heidegger to examine what it means to be human and how it is 
that we come to understand ourselves and the world from within the context of our 
practical experience. Sheehan explains that, for Heidegger, “the lived context or world 
within which things are encountered—the matrix of intelligibility structured by 
correlative human interest and purposes—was the source of meaning.”49 Heidegger 
understands this matrix, or context of meaningful relations, as the world of human 
beings.  
Heidegger describes the activity in which we encounter beings through our 
meaningful relations as an interpretive act of appropriation. Heidegger explains that “in 
interpretation understanding [another name for Dasein] appropriates what it has 
understood understandingly. In interpretation understanding does not become something 
different, but rather itself.”50 By interacting with and interpreting the beings we 
encounter, we not only determine their meaning for us but we also come to understand 
ourselves through that relation. For Heidegger the act of appropriation simultaneously 
also „propriates‟; it is the act through which we grant beings their meaning and their 
place in the context of our meaningful relations. For Heidegger, our understanding of 
both nature and the humanity of human beings occurs through the essential relation of 
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human beings to being as such. This essential relation occurs in thought and shapes our 
world as we articulate our meaningful relations in language.  
Heidegger explains that the essence of thinking lies in a meditative involvement 
with the beings we encounter and constitutes the essential ground of all action and all of 
our meaningful relations. He explains that “for every apprehending of beings in their 
being, being itself is already illumined and propriated in its truth.”51 Thus, ethical life 
concerns not first rational agency in the traditional sense, but rather and more originally 
the appropriative activity whereby our relations with things and others allow the being of 
beings and the world itself to become meaningful for us. Within the sphere of thought, 
accomplishment means allowing beings, and thereby being as such, to come forth in the 
fullness of its essence. “To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its 
essence, to lead it forth into this fullness.”52 Thus, when thinking remains within its 
proper sphere, thinking accomplishes being. 
Language, as the medium through which we express our meaningful relations, 
holds the key to understanding the relation of human beings to being which occurs in 
thought and constitutes the fundamental essence of Dasein. According to Heidegger, 
there is a “moral responsibility in every use of language.”53 This responsibility lies in 
authentically relating to beings in a way that allows them to come into the fullness of 
their own essence. Heidegger warns that through the materialist thinking of modern 
science and technology, “Language becomes a tool for objectifying and dominating 
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beings that subjects them to all forms of calculative thinking.”54 In his writings on 
modern technology, Heidegger warns that the calculative thinking of the sciences limits 
our interpretation of things and others to the sphere of instrumentality and thereby limits 
our ability to relate to others as more than just the means to accomplish the purposes of 
human beings. In his critique of the metaphysical interpretation of being that persists in 
the age of modern technology, Heidegger does not call for a return to primitivism. 
Rather, he merely urges that we must come to understand that modern science and 
technology only allow us to relate to the beings we encounter in one of their many 
possible spheres of meaning. In the age of modern technology, even thinking has 
become interpreted instrumentally as the theoretical thinking of the sciences. This 
interpretation of thinking covers over its true essence as poiesis and has caused us to 
become alienated from our essence as those who are needed and used for the presencing 
of being. For Heidegger, a deepened understanding of human existence and our fitting 
relation to the beings we encounter in the world around us should now include a 
consideration of how we might return to our proper abode, or ēthos, within the house of 
being.  
Traditionally, environmental ethicists have raised questions about the standing of 
animals, ecosystems, and natural bodies within the limits of our traditional notions of 
ethics in order to find footing for the formulation of a sound and unequivocal 
environmental ethic. Such an inquiry questions the fundamental ground of the relation 
between human beings and their environment and must begin with a proper 
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understanding of the authentic abode of human beings within the world. Heidegger 
concludes his “Letter on Humanism” by explaining the if we truly understand ourselves 
as the shepherds of being, “„ethics,‟ in keeping with the basic meaning of the word 
ēthos, should now say that „ethics‟ ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which 
thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of man, as one who ek-sists, is in 
itself the original ethics.”55 Here, Heidegger suggests that fundamental ontology, 
understood as the existential analytic of Dasein, serves as the ground for an authentically 
formulated ethic, an understanding of the most fitting relation between human beings 
and others. In reexamining the essence of human beings through the question of the 
meaning of being, Heidegger demonstrates that a renewed understanding of nature 
depends on a renewed understanding of our own human essence. In this way, 
Heidegger‟s description of human existence as Dasein, together with his notion of 
originary ethics can serve as the foundation for renegotiating and reexamining our 
understanding of nature and our relation to it in the way that William Cronon 
recommends. 
Environmental Justice and Anthropocentrism 
The environmental justice debate emerged out of questions about how to balance 
the rights of human beings with the rights of the nonhuman world to exist beyond our 
need and desire to commodify it. While the two sides of this debate generally understand 
themselves as disagreeing about whether or not nature should be interpreted 
anthropocentrically, Michael Zimmerman argues that Heidegger‟s philosophy teaches us 
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that attempts to extend our notions of rights to nature are yet another example of 
anthropocentrism. According to Zimmerman, it follows from Heidegger‟s thought that 
“we degrade nonhuman beings not only by treating them as commodities, but also by 
„giving‟ them rights on the basis of their status as inferior human beings.”56 
In his essay “Nature and Freedom,” Leslie Paul Thiele explains that “a position 
informed by Heideggerian thought takes one beyond both utilitarian and rights oriented 
ecological discourse by locating human dignity in a disclosive rather than sovereign 
freedom.”57 For Thiele, Heidegger‟s understanding of our ability to determine the being, 
or meaningfulness, of the entities we encounter in the world constitutes our disclosive 
freedom and serves as the potential for a fundamentally new understanding of 
environmental stewardship. Thiele draws his understanding of the disclosive freedom of 
human beings from Heidegger‟s designation of Dasein as the shepherd of being and 
maintains that a Heideggerian theory of stewardship would not only move environmental 
discourse beyond the question of rights but also that it has the potential to take us 
beyond both anthropocentric and biocentric environmental ethics altogether. Thus, 
whether or not we accept Thiele‟s notion of Heideggerian stewardship, it remains clear 
that Heidegger‟s interpretation of ethics as the ēthos, or the proper abode of human 
beings, has the potential to allow us to reexamine our relation to nature in fundamentally 
new ways that can augment the traditional approach to environmental thought.  
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Thus far we have examined how Heidegger‟s philosophy redefines our notions of 
ethics and thereby offers a new point of departure for understanding what it would mean 
authentically to relate to the nonhuman world. However, we have yet to explore how 
Heidegger‟s thought might allow us to redefine nature. Heidegger himself never offers a 
definition of nature that would replace those offered by modern science and Western 
metaphysics. In fact, in Being and Time, Heidegger warns us that “„nature‟ can never 
render worldliness intelligible.”58 For Heidegger, the term „worldliness‟ describes the 
way the world around us becomes meaningful through our involvement with it. Thus, 
Heidegger‟s warning demonstrates that the term „nature‟ can potentially prevent human 
beings from reflecting on and understanding their interconnectedness with the world 
around them. Perhaps Heidegger‟s unwillingness to redefine nature lies in the potential 
of our interpretations of nature to become truisms. Our analysis of the wilderness debate 
revealed that the terms „nature‟ and „wilderness‟ have had the same impact on our 
understanding of the nonhuman world that the term humanism has had on our 
understanding of our own humanity. By leaving the definition of nature open, Heidegger 
enables us to continually reexamine our understanding of the nonhuman realm and our 
relation to it.  
Though Heidegger did not offer us an alternative interpretation of nature, there 
are significant ways in which Heidegger‟s critique of Western metaphysics can 
contribute to a renewed understanding of the nonhuman world. First, as a deconstruction, 
Heidegger‟s critique of the instrumental understanding of being that persists in the age of 
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modern technology demonstrates how our contemporary interpretations of both being 
and nature have contributed to the mastery and domination of the nonhuman world. In 
the following chapter we will examine how Heidegger‟s deconstruction of our 
instrumental understanding of being as „constant presence‟ has the potential to contribute 
to a fuller understanding of our proper abode in our natural environment. In the final 
chapter, we will see that as a phenomenology of being, Heidegger‟s retrieval of the early 
Greek understanding of being as phusis has the potential to completely change the way 
we encounter ourselves and the world around us. Michael Zimmerman claims that for 
Heidegger, “Proper behavior towards beings can only follow from right understanding of 
what beings are.”59 Therefore, as we come to redefine our understanding of nature as it 
emerges from the context of our practical experience, we will also redefine the scope of 
our proper relationship to the nonhuman world.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE SAVING POWER OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY  
 
Introduction 
 In the introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger argues that in the modern era 
being has become interpreted in terms of one “definite mode of time, the „present.‟”60 
Heidegger argues that this interpretation has resulted in the received understanding of 
being as „constant presence‟ and has led us to interpret the beings we encounter as 
merely present at hand. In the works that followed Being and Time, Heidegger undertook 
a critique of the history of Western metaphysics that traces the development of this 
understanding of being from its origins in early Greek thought to its contemporary 
embodiment in modern science and technology. Heidegger‟s critique of Western 
metaphysics simultaneously demonstrates the way in which human beings have become 
alienated from the relation to being that defines their essence, and seeks to restore an 
understanding of being that would allow human beings to come into this essential 
relation and thereby authentically understand their place in existence.  
Heidegger‟s writings on modern technology demonstrate that the history Western 
metaphysics has not only resulted in our alienation from our own essence, but also 
prevented us from fully interpreting nature and understanding our fitting place within it. 
In his writings on modern technology Heidegger explains that the history of Western 
metaphysics has led contemporary Western civilization to interpret nature as merely “a 
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gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry.”61 
However, Heidegger‟s critique of modern technology and Western metaphysics should 
not be misinterpreted as a call for a return to primitivism, but rather as a deconstruction 
that would allow us to more fully understand human existence, its relation to modern 
technology, and ultimately grant us a fuller understanding of the fitting place for human 
existence within the world that surrounds us.  
As Heidegger‟s description of human existence as Dasein demonstrates, our 
essential relation to being unfolds through our meaningful relations with the beings we 
encounter in the context of our practical experience. Heidegger‟s critique of Western 
metaphysics, together with his description of human existence as Dasein, aims to shift 
the locus of our understanding of human existence and the world around us from the 
sphere of modern science and technology to the sphere of our everyday practical 
experience. In deconstructing the misconceptions that have prevented us from 
understanding the defining character of our involvement with the world around us, 
Heidegger‟s thought has the potential to allow human beings to more fully encounter the 
natural environment and thereby contributes to the development of authentic 
environmental concern. This chapter intends to follow Heidegger‟s critique of the 
history of Western metaphysics from its origins in early Greek thought to its culmination 
in modern science and technology in order to prepare for an analysis of Heidegger‟s 
retrieval and revival of the Heraclitean interpretation of being as phusis. Heidegger‟s 
account of the early Greek interpretation of phusis will be shown to provide the ground 
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for a renewed approach to interpreting nature and the character of a fitting relation 
between human beings and the natural environment.  
The Aristotelian Interpretation of Phusis 
 Heidegger initially intended for the project begun in Being and Time to 
have two major parts, of which the first was never completed and the second never 
begun. In the introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger describes the intention of the 
second part of his project as “a phenomenological destruction of the history of 
ontology.”62 Although the project which began in Being and Time was never undertaken 
in the way it was originally outlined, Heidegger devoted much of the work that followed 
to an examination of the history of being in an attempt to both overturn the 
misconceptions of Western metaphysics and to retrieve and appropriate what has 
remained „unthought‟ in the various stages of the history of being.  
For Heidegger, Aristotle‟s thought marked a critical transition in the history of 
being. In his examination of Aristotle‟s Physics, Heidegger finds both the origin of our 
understanding of being as constant presence and “the last echo” of the pre-Socratic 
understanding of being as phusis.
63
 According to Heidegger, Aristotle‟s Physics contains 
the first thoughtful and unified account of phusis and has guided all subsequent 
investigations of the essence of nature. Heidegger explains that since the Roman 
translation of the Greek word phusis as natura, “„nature‟ has become the fundamental 
word that designates essential relations that Western historical humanity has to beings, 
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both to itself and to beings other than itself.”64 Whether we use the word nature to 
describe our natural environment or as another name for the essences of beings, the word 
carries with it an interpretation of beings as a whole. We hear this originary 
understanding of nature in the word “meta-physics” which names “that knowledge 
wherein Western historical humanity preserves the truth of its relations to beings as a 
whole and the truth about those beings themselves.”65 According to Heidegger, “in quite 
an essential sense, meta-physics is „physics.‟ i.e., knowledge of phusis.”66 In his essay 
“On the Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle‟s Physics BI,” Heidegger traces key 
shifts in the way phusis has been understood from the pre-Socratics, through Aristotle, to 
our modern understanding of nature. If we follow Heidegger‟s analysis, it can been seen 
that the shift from the early Greek understanding of being as phusis to the modern 
understanding of being as constant presence has undermined our ability to encounter 
beings and the natural environment in the age of modern technology.  
In her writings on Heidegger‟s interpretation of Aristotle, Trish Glazebrook 
explains that “Heidegger sees Aristotle as a cusp.”67 Although Aristotle‟s thought offers 
the last articulation of the early Greek understanding of being as phusis, his separation of 
physics from metaphysics has contributed significantly to what Heidegger describes in 
“Science and Reflection” as the “entrapping securing” of nature which causes it to 
“vanish” within the “standing-reserve” of natural resources in the framework of modern 
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technology.”68 In his analysis of Aristotle‟s thought, Heidegger seeks to retrieve the 
early Greek understanding of being as phusis and to uncover the metaphysical 
suppositions that have led to our inability to authentically encounter and interpret nature 
in the modern era. Aristotle‟s thought guided the development of modern science and 
technology and offers essential insights into the modern understanding of nature and 
contemporary environmental attitudes.  
According to Heidegger, Aristotle‟s exposition of phusis begins with an 
examination of phusei-onta (natural beings), beings that come forth and are determined 
by phusis. For Heidegger, the key feature of Aristotle‟s account of natural beings lies in 
his explication of phusis by analogy with techne (craftsmanship). Aristotle attempts to 
describe both artifacts and natural beings in terms of the relation of morphe (form) to 
hule (matter) and the relation of dynamis (potentiality) to entelecheia (actuality). For 
Aristotle, actuality, understood as an activity characterized by movement, takes priority 
over potentiality in the determination of the being of an entity. Glazebrook emphasizes 
that here, we must notice that Aristotle‟s definition of movement extends far beyond our 
modern notion of locomotion and includes quantitative change, qualitative change, and 
alteration.
69
 In this sense, rest is also an instance of movement. Glazebrook explains that 
for Aristotle, “rest does not happen when movement stops, but rather is a fulfillment. 
This is the sense in which actuality is an activity for Aristotle. It is…a gathering up of 
movement into an end.”70 Artifacts (beings that are determined by techne) and natural 
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beings are gathered into this stillness differently. Heidegger explains that, for Aristotle, it 
is the nature of the movement from potentiality to actuality that primarily distinguishes 
artifacts from natural beings. While artifacts, reach fulfillment understood as 
entelecheia, at the end and culmination of production, natural beings move from 
potentiality to actuality through genesis (generation). 
Aristotle‟s understanding of the being of beings as a movement from potentiality 
to actuality in the interaction between matter and form allowed him to understand being 
as a process of unfolding, or as Heidegger describes it, as „presencing.‟ In this insight 
into the dynamic and generative character of being, Heidegger hears the last “echo of the 
great beginning of Greek philosophy.”71 He explains, “In this beginning being was 
thought as phusis.”72 However, Heidegger argues that while the primacy that Aristotle 
placed on actuality over potentiality allowed him to describe the emergence and 
determination of artifacts, his account failed to fully grasp the emergence of natural 
beings. According to Heidegger, Aristotle‟s conception of “entelecheia comprises the 
basic concept of Western metaphysics in whose changes of meaning we can best 
estimate, and indeed must see the distance between Greek though in the beginning and 
the metaphysics that followed.”73 According to Heidegger, “the basic thesis that 
Aristotle puts forth concerning the hierarchy of entelecheia and dynamis runs as follows: 
entelecheia is ousisa (being) „to a greater degree‟ than dynamis is.”74 Foltz explains that 
Heidegger understands the conflation of being and actuality as “underlying the meaning 
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of being for the metaphysical tradition as „constant presence.‟”75 While, Foltz does not 
offer an account of how the conflation of these terms occurred, Aristotle‟s own words 
offer us essential insights into this shift in our understanding of being. When we interpret 
the beings we encounter as actualized, or determined by entelecheia, we interpret their 
being as being fully exhausted in the here and now. This emphasis on the embodiment of 
beings in the present over looks their potential, or dynamic character, and leads us to 
interpret their being as fully determined by their constant presence. In his writings on 
modern science, Heidegger explains that this interpretation of being results in the 
“objectification” of the beings we encounter in the age of modern technology.76  
In addition, Heidegger argues that Aristotle‟s explication of phusis by analogy 
with techne led him to interpret natural beings as self-made artifacts. This analogy 
carried over throughout the history of Western metaphysics and, Heidegger concludes, 
“provides the ground for the possibility, or even the necessity, of subjecting and 
mastering nature through machine technology.”77 The Roman appropriation of 
Aristotle‟s thought resulted in what Michael Zimmerman describes as a “productionist 
metaphysics” which interprets the being of all beings as predicated upon production.78 
Metaphysics, now separated from physics through the influence of Aristotle, became the 
search for the ultimate cause of the production of beings. According to Heidegger, the 
Roman translation of energeia (actualization) as actus (act) and dynamis (potentiality) as 
                                                 
75
 Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature, 25. 
76
 Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” 173. 
77
 Ibid., 220.  
78
 Michael Zimmerman, “Heidegger‟s Phenomenology and Contemporary Environmentalism,” in Eco-
Phenomenology, Back to the Earth Itself, ed. Charles Brown and Ted Toadvine (New York: University of 
New York Press, 2003), 82. 
 38 
 
potentia (capacity) marked the beginning of the interpretation of natural beings as mere 
objects subordinate to the observing subject and thus, “the Greek world toppled.”79 
According to Glazebrook, the productionist metaphysics which emerged in the 
thought of Aristotle not only resulted in our constricted ability to interpret beings and the 
natural world, but has also defined the character and approach of modern science. She 
explains that the theoretical approach of modern science has its roots in what Heidegger 
describes as the “metaphysics of subjectivity” and “can be traced back to Aristotle‟s 
theory of production.”80 Glazebrook argues further that for Heidegger, the metaphysics 
of subjectivity reached its full embodiment in the thought of Descartes and continues to 
guide modern science and technology today.
81
 The metaphysics of subjectivity takes 
shape as what Heidegger describes as the “calculative thinking” or “theoretical attitude” 
which characterizes modern science and technology.
82
  
In his Discourse on Thinking Heidegger explains, “calculative thinking is not 
meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in 
everything that is.”83 Glazebrook explains that the emergence of calculative thinking has 
had a profound influence not only on the way we understand the world around us, but 
also on the character of our meaningful relations with the beings we encounter in the 
everyday context of our practical experience.  
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According to Glazebrook, the calculative thinking of modern science has resulted 
in a transition from understanding the world through our “concernful dealings” to the 
understanding oriented by the “theoretical attitude.” 84 Thus, the history of Western 
metaphysics has shifted the ground of our understanding of the world around us from the 
sphere of our practical experience to the sphere of modern science. Heidegger explains 
that the theoretical attitude of modern science which characterizes our age threatens “the 
rootedness, the autochthony, of man…today at is very core.”85 For Heidegger, the 
autochthony of human beings stems from the essential relation to being that defines their 
character. In alienating human existence from this essential relation, the theoretical 
attitude of modern science has not only prevented us from understanding our own human 
existence, but also how we stand in relation to the world around us and has prevented us 
from authentically interpreting our fitting place within the natural environment. Like his 
deconstruction of the received interpretation of being as constant presence, Heidegger‟s 
examination of the emergence of the metaphysics of subjectivity which characterizes the 
era of modern technology has the potential to overturn the misconceptions of Western 
metaphysics and clear the way for a renewed understanding of being that would restore 
our essential relation to being and our understanding of the fitting place of human 
existence within the world that surrounds us.  
The Metaphysics of Subjectivity and Modern Science 
In an excerpt from his treatise What is a Thing? entitled “Modern Science, 
Metaphysics, and Mathematics,” Heidegger examines the way in which both the 
                                                 
84
 Glazebrook, “From Phusis to Nature, Techne to Technology,” 109. 
85
 Heidegger, “Memorial Address,” 49.  
 40 
 
Cartesian interpretation of the decisive faculty of the ego and the trajectory of 
Aristotelian metaphysics influenced the development of the modern sciences through 
Galileo and Newton. Through an examination of these figures, Heidegger offers an 
account of the origin and emergence of the metaphysics of subjectivity which 
characterizes modern science and its influence on our everyday understanding of the 
world around us. Heidegger begins this examination by exploring the essential 
difference between ancient and modern science.  
According to Heidegger, modern science has generally been understood to differ 
from medieval and ancient science based on the assumption that modern science starts 
with facts, while the former operates primarily with concepts. However, both modern 
science and ancient science employ concepts and facts in the investigation of nature. The 
key difference between the two, Heidegger argues, lies in “how facts are conceived and 
how concepts are established” in each of these approaches to science.86 While, modern 
science is often said to differ from ancient and medieval science in its experimental 
approach, Heidegger argues that this is not so. “The experiment or test to get information 
concerning the behavior of things…was also already familiar in ancient times and in the 
Middle Ages.”87 Here, the decisive difference between these two approaches lies in the 
manner in which experiments are constructed and the general intent behind the use of 
experimental investigation. Although modern and ancient science are generally 
understood to differ with respect to the use of facts and experimentation, Heidegger 
                                                 
86
 Martin Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics,” in Basic Writings, ed. David 
Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 271. 
87
 Ibid., 272.  
 41 
 
argues that there is a third characteristic which is perhaps even more definitive of the 
essence of both ancient and modern science. Both ancient and modern science can be 
said to be a “calculative and measuring investigation,” again, however, “it is a question 
of how and in what sense calculating and measuring are applied and carried out, and 
what importance they have for the determination of the objects [of investigation] 
themselves.”88 Fundamental to all three of these characterizations of science, what 
characterizes “the basic movement of science itself…is the manner of working with 
things [the beings encountered by science] and the metaphysical projection of the 
thingness of the things.”89 Heidegger describes this fundamental feature of modern 
science as „the mathematical‟ and aims to understand the fundamental difference 
between ancient and modern science through an investigation of what mathematics and 
the mathematical mean within the scope of modern science. While it may seem that the 
answer to this question can only be uncovered in mathematics itself, Heidegger explains 
that “mathematics is only one particular formulation of the mathematical.”90  
 The word „mathematics‟ stems from the Greek expression ta mathemata, which 
means both that which can be learned and that which can be taught. Today, we are used 
to thinking of the mathematical primarily as it relates to number, yet Heidegger explains 
that number is only one special case of the mathematical. Ta mathemata is related to 
learning in its full sense as “a kind of grasping and appropriating” of the beings we 
encounter.
91
 Yet, not every act of appropriation can be equated with learning. According 
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to Heidegger “the mathemata, the mathematical, is that „about‟ things which we already 
really know. Therefore we do not first get it out of things, but in a certain way, we bring 
it already with us.”92 This insight becomes clear if we examine the way in which 
„number‟ can be said to be something mathematical. For example, when we see three 
chairs, we say that there are three. However, the chairs do not help us understand what 
„three‟ is and neither would any other three objects. Rather, we can count three objects 
only if we already know in advance what three is. Thus, number does not completely 
characterize the mathematical but rather it is only one example of the way in which 
human beings have the propensity to interpret the beings they encounter in nature 
through predetermined concepts. For Heidegger, this propensity defines the essence of 
the mathematical and is the origin of the theoretical attitude which characterizes modern 
science. In his writings on Newton and Galileo, Heidegger describes the way in which 
ancient science shifted from a meditative involvement with the world we experience to 
the disinterested gaze of modern science which interprets the world through 
predetermined concepts projected in advance by the metaphysics of subjectivity.  
From his exposition of the essence of the numerical, Heidegger concludes, “the 
mathematical is thus the fundamental presupposition of the knowledge of things.”93 As 
the fundamental character of modern science, the mathematical is the understanding of 
things in which we are always already moving and characterizes “the fundamental 
position we take towards things.”94 For Heidegger, the mathematical describes the way 
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in which the thingness of things (understood as the being of beings) is both encountered 
and determined according to modern science. Although the modern sciences did not 
appear all at once, Heidegger argues that it was not until the seventeenth century that the 
decisive foundations of modern science were laid. The science of the seventeenth 
century reached its first complete articulation in Newton‟s Principia Mathematica. The 
work of Newton was both the culmination of that which preceded it, and served as the 
foundation for the further development of modern science. Today, classical physics is 
understood as Newtonian physics, and during Newton‟s lifetime, the law of inertia 
became accepted as “a law of nature universally received by all philosophers.”95 What 
Heidegger finds most remarkable about Newton‟s law of inertia is that while today it has 
become accepted as self-evident, “during the preceding fifteen hundred years it was not 
only unknown, but nature and beings in general were experienced in such a way that it 
would have been senseless.”96 Thus, Heidegger concludes that Newton and Aristotle 
experienced nature in fundamentally different ways. For Aristotle, phusis described the 
presencing of beings who move of their own accord. Within the Aristotelian model, a 
thing‟s essence determines both its movement and its proper bounds within nature; “The 
fiery moves upward and earth towards its center…all natural things move themselves 
toward their end for Aristotle, an end determined by their essential nature.”97 However, 
according to the modern conception of nature, this notion of the proper bounds of natural 
entities is lost as the understanding of place as „proper bonds‟ becomes replaced by 
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modern science‟s notion of interchangeable points in indeterminate space. On the 
Newtonian model, beings are understood to move under the influence of external forces 
rather than according to their inner nature. Heidegger‟s analysis demonstrates that in 
interpreting the being of beings from the preconceived notion of indiscriminate external 
forces, Newton‟s law of inertia projects the being of beings in advance. Although 
Newton‟s laws of motion offer the first formal articulation of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity in modern science, Heidegger explains that his understanding of motion had 
its roots in the thought of Galileo. 
According to Heidegger, when Galileo claimed that “all bodies move equally 
fast, and that the differences in the time it takes them to fall derives only from the 
resistance of the air, not from the different inner natures of the bodies,” beings 
themselves became understood as the interchangeable objects of science.
98
 Thus, 
Heidegger concludes, Galileo was the first mathematically to project the being of 
entities. His understanding of the being of the objects of science was not determined 
through his observations, but through the a priori projection of his conception of what 
constitutes a body. In fact, Galileo asserted his theory despite the fact that it contradicted 
his observed experience. In his free-fall experiments there was a slight yet observable 
difference in the time it took different bodies to fall from the Tower of Pisa. Similarly, 
Newton‟s law is based on a body left to itself and unaffected by outside forces. In fact, 
there is no such body discoverable in nature.  
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For Heidegger, the mathematical project embodies the fundamental trait of 
modern thought and culminates in Descartes' masterwork, Meditations on First 
Philosophy. According to Heidegger, a simple reflection on the title of this treatise 
demonstrates that Descartes‟s „first philosophy‟ is an appropriation and further 
development of the „protē philosophia‟ of Aristotle. Like the philosophy of Aristotle, the 
investigations of Descartes are directed at the being of beings. Descartes‟s thought 
emerged during a time when mathematics had already begun to assert itself against 
theology as the ultimate foundation of knowledge and truth. During this time the 
mathematical project intended “to explicate itself as the standard of all thought and to 
establish the rules [of understanding] which thereby arise.”99 Descartes‟s reflections on 
the essential meaning of mathematics significantly contributed to that project. In fact, 
Heidegger asserts that “the modern concept of science itself” is first developed in the 
later thought of Descartes.
100
 Through his notion of radical doubt, the mathematical 
project founded the essential ground of certainty in Descartes‟ cogito sum. Through the 
influence of Cartesian metaphysics in the early modern period, the existence of the 
subject became the metaphysical ground for the determination of beings. In fact, 
Descartes‟s thought completely redefined our understanding of „the subject‟ in terms of 
the sum of his cogito sum. Thus, the newly defined subjectivity of human beings became 
characterized primarily as the „I‟ of Descartes‟s „I think.‟ 
With the „I‟ now established as the foundation of all thought, and thereby all 
knowledge and certainty, the categories of human reason assumed the role of the 
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principles of certainty that the mathematical project sought to establish. According to 
Heidegger, Cartesian metaphysics determines the being of beings “out of the „I am‟ as 
the certainty of positing.”101 He explains further that before Descartes, “everything at 
hand for itself was a „subject‟; but now the „I‟ becomes the special subject, that with 
regard to which all the remaining things first determine themselves as such.”102 
Heidegger explains that through of the legacy of Descartes, the decisive faculty of the 
ego (I-subject) is now understood as the ground of all objectivity, understood as truth. 
Anything which has not measured up to its scrutiny is now understood as merely 
subjective. Heidegger explains that “this reversal of the meanings of the words 
subjectum and objectum is no mere affair of usage; it is a radical change of Dasein, that 
is to say, of the clearing of the being of beings on the basis of the predominance of the 
mathematical.”103 Thus, in describing the faculty of the ego as the ground of certainty, 
Descartes founds the mathematical project within the subject and grants it its full 
articulation as the metaphysics of subjectivity. According to Glazebrook, “Heidegger 
grounds modern science…in a Cartesian metaphysics of subjectivity. It is mathematical 
for him in that it treats ideal objects and brings to experience from ideas an a priori 
determination.”104 Heidegger‟s analysis demonstrates that Descartes‟s redefinition of the 
subject has defined the theoretical attitude of modern science. In his writings on modern 
science and technology, Heidegger describes how the projective metaphysics of 
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subjectivity, coupled with our understanding of being as constant presence, effects the 
way we conceptualize and relate to the beings we encounter in nature.  
In his writings on Heidegger‟s philosophy of science and technology, Foltz 
explains that for Heidegger, modern science and technology are not merely the vocation 
of scientists and engineers. According to Foltz: 
It is the scientific analysis, and not the family recipe, that tells us how we 
actually ought to eat. It is the scientific diagram, and not the painting or the 
sculpture, that tells us what the world around us is actually like. It is the scientific 
account, and not the creation myth, that tells us how things actually began.
105
 
 
From a Heideggerian position, the perspective of modern science fundamentally shapes 
our understanding of the world around us as well as the character of our response to the 
beings we encounter. As we shift from an examination of the origins of Western 
metaphysics to Heidegger‟s account of its embodiment in modern science and 
technology, we shift from an examination of our ability to understand and interpret the 
beings we encounter in the modern era to the relations that are predicated upon that 
understanding.  
Modern Science and Technology 
 Throughout the history of Western metaphysics, nature has come to be 
interpreted as a collection of forces calculable in advance and projected on the basis of 
the metaphysics of subjectivity. For Heidegger, Western metaphysics lies at the heart of 
modern science as the fundamental interpretation of the being of beings that guides all 
further investigation into nature. In his essay “Science and Reflection,” Heidegger offers 
an account of how our contemporary attitude toward nature, as embodied in modern 
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science and modern technology, developed through the appropriation of Aristotelian 
metaphysics and the thought of the early moderns. Heidegger aims to describe the 
essence of modern science by examining the statement: “Science is the theory of the 
real.”106 He focuses his inquiry on the terms „theory‟ and „real,‟ and undertakes an 
etymological questioning of the true essences of these terms through an examination of 
their original early Greek meanings. 
 Through an examination of what we mean when we say that something is „real‟ 
today in the modern era, Heidegger tells the history of how we lost sight of the early 
Greek understanding of being as phusis and began to interpret beings as merely present 
at hand. Heidegger begins his analysis by explaining that the German word „real‟ (das 
wirkliche) brings with it an articulation of the world of work (das wirkenden). With this 
he suggests, in the modern articulation of „the real‟ we hear the culmination of 
Aristotle‟s notion of ergon (work). According to Heidegger, Aristotle‟s notion of ergon 
must be thought by way of this understanding of energeia (activity) and ultimately his 
understanding of entelecheia. During the Roman period, Aristotle‟s notions of ergon and 
energeia became understood by way of the Roman term actus, and through this 
translation, an entirely new realm of understanding opened up. Heidegger describes this 
new realm of understanding as “the relating of cause and effect.”107 
Heidegger‟s analysis of our contemporary notion of „the real‟ demonstrates that 
the Roman appropriation of Aristotelian metaphysics has led to our contemporary 
understanding of the world in terms of cause and effect. Heidegger argues that this 
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understanding has led us to interpret beings as objects, as that which has come about 
through causation. Foltz explains that, for Heidegger, when beings are interpreted as 
objects, natural entities “are made to stand over against the subject; [their] presence is 
not one of neutrality and indifference, but rather one of confrontation with the 
subject…this would no doubt be a dissolution of the self-standing of nature, an 
enslavement to the subject.”108 For Heidegger, our inability to consider the self-standing 
of the beings we encounter outside of the interpretive framework of the natural sciences 
leads us to interpret them merely as the means for human ends in the framework of 
modern technology.  
 Contemporary understanding of the word „theory‟ has also degenerated from 
what was originally meant by the ancient Greek theōria. The early Greeks understood 
theōria to mean “pure relationship to the outward appearances belonging to whatever 
presences.”109 The Romans translated theōria as contemplatio (contemplation), and with 
this translation came a profound shift in thought. Contemplatio signifies a 
compartmentalizing of the world into different enclosed sectors and concepts. While for 
the early Greeks, theōria meant a meditative involvement with beings as they appear to 
us, in the modern era theory has now come to mean the mere refining of that which 
presences in the modern age as objectness. By demanding that nature present itself as a 
collection of objects for manipulation, modern science determines the scope of its 
questions and answers in advance and operates within the projective metaphysics of 
subjectivity. The projective metaphysics of subjectivity, which influenced Western 
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metaphysics through the thought of Descartes, manifests in modern science as the mere 
refinement of the projected objects of its investigations. While this interpretation of the 
being of beings limits our ability to encounter nature fully, interpret beings, and 
subsequently to fully come into our own essence as human beings, for Heidegger, the 
projective metaphysics of subjectivity becomes even more dangerous in its embodiment 
in modern technology. In modern technology, the projective metaphysics of subjectivity 
persists as what Heidegger describes as Ge-stell, often translated as technological 
enframing.  
 In his essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger begins his 
examination of modern technology by examining its origins in early Greek thought. He 
explains that the word „technology‟ comes from the early Greek word, techne, which 
described the activities of craftsmen, the arts of the mind, and the fine arts. For the early 
Greeks, techne and phusis were regarded as the two complementary aspects of poiesis, 
which means to bring forth out of concealment, whether through phusis, or through the 
hands of human beings. According to Heidegger, the Greeks described this bringing 
forth into unconcealment as a form of revealing, aletheia, the coming forth of truth. 
Understanding technology in this way opens an entirely new realm of its essence. “It is 
the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.”110 Therefore, modern technology must be 
understood as more than mere technics; it is the culmination of Western metaphysics and 
constitutes the framework through which we interpret and interact with the world around 
us.  
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 Heidegger recognizes that, although modern technology has its conceptual roots 
in the early Greek notion of techne, the revealing of modern technology differs from that 
of techne. The revealing that holds sway in modern technology does not unfold as 
poiesis, but as a challenging forth “which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it 
supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such.”111 In the era of modern 
technology, our meaningful relations with things and others increasingly take on this 
challenging character, which Heidegger names Ge-stell (enframing). Heidegger warns 
that technological enframing not only challenges the forces of nature, it also challenges 
the humanity of human beings. 
When man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of his own 
conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges 
him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears 
into the objectlessness of standing reserve.
112
 
 
While modern science precludes our ability to conceive of the self-standing of the beings 
we encounter and thereby projects the being of beings as mere objects, in modern 
technology our ability to relate to others is constricted even further as we interpret 
natural entities and forces as merely the standing reserve of natural resources. In 
challenging forth the world we encounter, human beings too are challenged forth as the 
ones who order and arrange the standing reserve, and thereby also become installed in 
the framework of modern technology.  
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The Saving Power of Modern Technology 
Heidegger describes enframing as the supreme danger of our age. In the age of 
modern technology, our attempt to gain full intelligibility of the world around us has 
changed from the relentless pursuit of constant presence to an unending stockpiling of 
the standing energy reserve. In his reading of Heidegger‟s philosophy of technology, 
Foltz warns that “the ontological status of nature in a technological world is to be a 
resource, to be raw material, and hence to be one component of the inventory that is 
installed within the technological framework,” and nothing more.113 Modern technology 
has led us to interpret ourselves as the lords and masters of nature rather than as the 
„shepherds of being‟ and has brought us into the era of environmental crisis. However, 
Hubert Dreyfus reminds us that Heidegger‟s critique of modern technology should not 
be interpreted as a call to “reactionary rebellion against technology.”114 Rather, 
Heidegger‟s analysis aims to bring us into a free relationship with the essence of 
technology. Dreyfus emphasizes that we must not overlook Heidegger‟s claim that 
“When we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology, we find 
ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim.”115 For Heidegger, understanding the 
essence of technology has the potential to restore our essential relation to being and can 
allow us to participate in the unfolding of being beyond the sphere of modern 
technology.  
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Heidegger warns that as „the supreme danger,‟ technology threatens to push out 
the essential mode of revealing as poiesis and thereby present itself as the only way in 
which to interpret and interact with the beings we encounter. However, he tells us that 
the essential origin of technology lies in techne, which for the early Greeks was also a 
form poiesis. For Heidegger, this essential insight holds the key to a fuller understanding 
of the essence of technology, and to restoring our essential relation to being by allowing 
human existence to participate in the essential modes of revealing as phusis and poiesis. 
In describing the danger of modern technology, Heidegger tells us that the famous words 
of Hölderlin “Where danger is, grows the saving power also,” should say to us 
“poetically man dwells on this earth.”116 In his later writings Heidegger argues that these 
lines of poetry speak of the essence of human beings and demonstrate that the poetic 
defines “the basic character of human existence.”117 In his writings on poetic dwelling 
Heidegger describes human existence from out of the essential relation to being that 
defines our essence. In defining human existence as poetic, Heidegger seeks to describe 
an attunement to being that would restore our understanding of the definitive character 
of our involvement with the world around us. Although Heidegger‟s analysis of modern 
science and technology does not call for their abandonment, Heidegger understands the 
meaning that arises from our every day involvement with the world around us as 
providing a fuller and more fundamental understanding of human existence. According 
to Foltz, Heidegger‟s description of “dwelling poetically on the earth constitutes the 
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possibility for a genuine environmental ethic.”118 Heidegger‟s description of poetic 
dwelling describes the meditative involvement with the world around us that would 
allow nature to become meaningful for us beyond the sphere of modern science and 
technology and to come into our understanding as an essential part of human existence. 
However, as Heidegger‟s writings on the early Greek notion of phusis demonstrate, the 
ability to understand the defining character of our involvement with the world depends 
not only on a reevaluation of our own existence, but also of our understanding of being. 
The following chapter will examine Heidegger‟s revival of the early Greek 
understanding of being as phusis in order to examine the path Heidegger lays for poetic 
dwelling, and ultimately a fuller understanding of the fitting relation between human 
existence and the nonhuman world.  
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CHAPTER IV 
POETIC DWELLING  
 
Introduction 
 Heidegger‟s critique of Western metaphysics demonstrates that its culmination in 
modern science and technology have not only alienated us from our own existence, but 
have also prevented us from understanding our fitting place in the world around us. 
While Heidegger‟s existential analytic of Dasein demonstrates that an understanding of 
our fitting place in the natural world must begin with a reexamination of the relation 
between being and human existence, we must keep in mind that for Heidegger, this 
necessarily entails a reevaluation of our understanding of being. Heidegger‟s critique of 
Western metaphysics not only deconstructs the received understanding of being as 
constant presence which characterizes the age of modern technology, but also offers an 
alternative understanding of being that clears the way for a fuller understanding of 
human existence and the proper abode of human beings within the natural environment. 
In order to do so, Heidegger turns to the origins of Western thought in the fragments of 
Heraclitus in order to revive the early Greek characterization of being as phusis, 
aletheia, and logos. Although Heidegger‟s interpretation of Heraclitus is idiosyncratic 
and in several regards perhaps dubious, it nevertheless remains significant in its own 
right and in particular for the present project. For Heidegger, the Heraclitean 
understanding of being would allow us to more fully encounter the world around us by 
interpreting beings as „things‟ rather than objects. Heidegger writings on „thingness‟ 
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demonstrate that allowing the beings we encounter to become meaningful for us from 
out of the context of our meaningful relations, rather than framework of modern science 
and technology grants them their independence. Interpreting beings in a way that grants 
them their self-standing allows us to come into the ethical relation to being which 
Heidegger describes as „poetic dwelling.‟ Heidegger‟s exposition of poetic dwelling 
demonstrates that grounding our essential understanding of ourselves and the world 
around us in the context of our practical experience would allow us to encounter nature 
more fully. Heidegger‟s characterization of poetic dwelling demonstrates the 
interconnectedness of human existence and the natural environment and thereby 
promotes the development of authentic environmental concern. 
The Thing 
 In “Science and Reflection” Heidegger argues that understanding existence from 
the perspective of causality leads us to interpret the being of beings as objectness. 
According to Heidegger, our modern understanding of the word object stems from the 
Latin term objectum and is related to the German word Gegenstand, which means to 
stand “over and against.”119 When we project the being of the beings we encounter as 
objects, we come into a challenging relation with them in which they are made to stand 
“over and against” the subject. In his writings on modern technology, Heidegger 
explains that the relations circumscribed by our understanding of beings as objects 
provokes us to challenge them forth as a standing reserve (Bestand) of natural resources. 
Thus, in the modern era, the natural entities and forces we encounter have lost their own 
                                                 
119
 Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” 162. 
 57 
 
independent self-standing and have come to be interpreted solely as the means for 
production in the framework of modern technology. Heidegger argues that if we allow 
ourselves to encounter beings beyond the representational model of modern science and 
technology, then we will interpret them as „things‟ rather than objects and recognize 
their independence and beyond their mere relevance to human ends and goals. 
Heidegger‟s examination of the „thingness‟ of the beings we encounter seeks to establish 
that recognizing that the being of the entities we encounter is not exhausted by their 
ability to conform to our ends and goals allows us them to take on a greater significance 
for us and profoundly effects the character of our involvement with them. 
 Heidegger begins his exposition of the full sense of the word „thing‟ by 
explaining that in the modern era distance has become meaningless. Through new 
information technologies we are able to traverse great distances almost instantaneously. 
However, “the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness.” He continues: “what 
is nearest are things.”120 According to Heidegger, the word „thing‟ has one of its origins 
in the Roman word res, which means, “what bears on men, [and] concerns them.”121 The 
theoretical attitude, the disinterested gaze of modern science which characterizes 
modernity, has abolished all distances so that what is closest to us in proximity remains 
furthest in thought. Thus, in his examination of distance, Heidegger explains that our 
relentless search for objectivity has uprooted us from the context of our meaningful 
relations, the „things‟ that should bear on our concerns. In restoring the full sense of our 
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understanding of the word „thing,‟ Heidegger aims to re-contextualize our understanding 
of the beings we encounter, the world around us, and our self-understanding within the 
sphere of our practical experience. 
 According to Heidegger, the term thing has a second origin in the Old High 
German word for „gathering.‟ He explains, things become meaningful to us as things by 
gathering together our meaningful relations, which emerge from out of the fourfold of 
“earth, sky, divinities and mortals.”122 According to James C. Edwards, for Heidegger, 
the „earth‟ of the fourfold describes the material conditions of life, the ground of our 
existence. He interprets the „sky‟ as signifying the horizon of our understanding in which 
beings are able to stand forth and be seen. For Edwards, the „divinities‟ describes that 
which remains unknown and the “eschatological hope” for a time of “haleness and 
wholeness” to come, which characterizes human existence.123 Finally, on his reading, 
„mortals‟ describes human finitude, the ultimate limit and condition of our existence.124 
Although Heidegger‟s concept of the fourfold is notoriously complex and ambiguous, it 
can be understood to describe the conditions of human experience and the context of 
meaningful relations in which the beings we encounter become meaningful for us, and 
thereby bear on our concerns. 
In his elucidation of Heidegger‟s notion of Dasein, Sheehan argues that in Being 
and Time Heidegger describes our essential relation to being as the source of meaning.
125
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However, in Heidegger‟s later thought this idea takes on greater subtlety. For Heidegger, 
the „fourfold‟ describes the way in which our fundamental relation to being occurs in 
and establishes the world of our practical experience. He describes the gathering in 
which the thing becomes meaningful for us as a mirror play in which we grant the beings 
we encounter their independence and self-standing, and in doing so, define the way we 
understand ourselves. In his exposition of „thingness‟ Heidegger is not merely 
developing a new epistemological model but he is also describing a fundamentally new 
sense of human comportment. According to Edwards, Heidegger develops his notion of 
„the thing‟ or thingness in “an endeavor which can only be described as ethical.”126 In 
granting the beings we encounter their independence and self-standing, we come into our 
own essence as the shepherds of being. Thus, in restoring our essential relation to being, 
the thing grants us entry into our proper abode and brings us into the ethical relation that 
Heidegger describes as poetic dwelling. Whereas in the modern era we have come to 
understand ourselves and our place in the natural environment primarily from the 
perspective of the modern sciences, Heidegger‟s thought allows us to interpret nature 
and our fitting place within it in a profoundly different way.  
As we have seen in our examination of Heidegger‟s exploration of modern 
science and technology, our contemporary understanding of being as constant presence 
has prevented us from our understanding our essential relation to being. This 
understanding has precluded our ability to fully interpret the beings we encounter as 
things. In order to restore our essential relation to being, Heidegger returns to the 
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beginning of Western metaphysics in the thought of Heraclitus in order to retrieve and 
reinvigorate the early Greek understanding of being as phusis. According to Heidegger, 
the term phusis was translated by the Romans as natura, and is the origin of our 
contemporary understanding of nature. Thus, in retrieving the Heraclitean understanding 
of being as phusis, Heidegger not only gives us a new point of departure for 
understanding our fundamental relation to being but, he also provides us with a new 
perspective through which to interpret the beings we encounter and our authentic place 
in the nonhuman world. For Heidegger, the early Greek understanding of being as phusis 
not only affords us the perspective needed to interpret the beings we encounter as things, 
but also to come into the ethical comportment with the world around us which he 
describes as poetic dwelling. 
Being as Phusis and Aletheia 
 In his essay “On the Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle‟s Physics BI,” 
Heidegger tells us that the key achievement and most essential insight of Aristotle‟s 
thought lies in his understanding of being as phusis. Understanding being in this way 
allows Aristotle to interpret being not as constant presence but rather as „presencing,‟ an 
unfolding that occurs over time. In the same essay, Heidegger names Heraclitus as the 
most original thinker of phusis. Whereas Aristotle‟s explication of phusis by analogy 
with techne contributed to our understanding of being as constant presence, Heraclitus, 
in thinking this term together with his notions of aletheia and logos, offers us a more 
complete understanding of being and our fundamental relation to it. 
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The term aletheia has traditionally been translated as truth. However, for 
Heidegger, this term should not be understood to mean truth understood as certainty, but 
rather as the meaning of being. According to Foltz, thinking phusis in connection with 
aletheia allows us to recognize being “in its character of self-withdrawal and self-
concealing,” which has been overlooked by the history of Western metaphysics thus 
far.
127
 Recognizing the self-concealing aspect of being would allow us to realize that the 
being of the entities we encounter is not fully exhausted by our interpretation of their 
ability to conform to human ends and purposes. Therefore, in thinking being as phusis 
and in connection to aletheia, the Heraclitean understanding of being as phusis allows us 
to grant the beings we encounter their self-standing and independence, which Heidegger 
describes as their character as things. 
 Heidegger explores the Heraclitean notion of phusis and its relation to aletheia 
by analyzing Heraclitus‟s Fragment B 16 (Fr. B 16), which reads: “How can one hide 
himself before that which never sets?”128 According to Heidegger, understanding being 
as phusis allows us to understand being‟s true nature as “presencing,” as the outgrowth 
unified in the interplay of concealment and unconcealment. As unconcealed, it stands in 
view as the world we experience. As concealed, it is the condition of the emergence of 
all that is. According to Heidegger, it is in the nature of unconcealment to recede from 
our understanding. This essential aspect of being has been overlooked throughout the 
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history of Western metaphysics and its self-effacing character has contributed to our 
misinterpretation of being as constant presence.  
 Heidegger orients his meditation on Fr. B 16 by its final word, lathoi, which on 
his reading orients the thought of the fragment. This word describes the human condition 
which, according to Heidegger, is characterized by the way we stand in unconcealment 
as essentially concealed from ourselves. The fragment asks how human existence, as that 
which remains essentially concealed, stands in relation to concealment thought as the 
ground of phusis. Fr. B 16 asks, “How could anyone remain concealed in relation to that 
which remains unconcealed?”129 Thus, according to Heidegger, that in relation to which 
human beings stand, as essentially concealed, is “to me dunon pote, that which never 
sets.”130 For Heidegger, these words speak of phusis thought as concealment. Fragment 
B 16 “ponders the relation of man to 'the never-setting' and thinks human being from this 
relation.”131 Consequently, our inquiry into the meaning of lathoi begins as an 
examination of „the never setting.‟ 
According to Heidegger, the key to understanding fragment B 16 is the phrase to 
dunon: 
 
It [to dunon] is related to duo, which means to envelop...to go into something...A 
slight transposition of the construction into the form to mepote dunon clarifies at 
once what the fragment is talking about.
132
 
 
Heidegger‟s transposition demonstrates that the never setting should be thought 
simultaneously as the ever rising, as to aei phuon, which Heraclitus articulates as phusis. 
In phusis we now hear both concealment and unconcealment, which for Heidegger, are 
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“one and the Same.”133 According to G.S. Kirk, Heraclitus, when speaking of the 
essential unity of opposites, would also refer to them as “the Same.”134 With this 
understanding of phusis in hand, Heidegger then turns to an examination of Fragment 
123 (Fr. 123): phusis kruptesthai philei, which he claims has commonly been translated 
“the essence of things (phusis) loves to hide.”135 To attain to the essential thought of the 
Fr. 123 Heidegger will reinterpret it as: “Rising (out of self-concealing) bestows favor 
on self-concealing.”136 Heidegger offers this unusual interpretation of the fragment to 
illustrate that the unconcealment of phusis cannot be understood in isolation from 
concealment. Phusis describes “the realm in which the reciprocal intimacy of revealing 
and concealing founds and governs.”137 According to Heidegger, the terms hharmonei 
and aphaneis in Fragment 54 also speak „the Same.‟ Therefore, if we essentially think 
the concealing and unconcealing of phusis as „the Same,‟ phusis should now be 
understood as the jointure in virtue of which that which stands in unconcealment 
presences. 
 Although the term aletheia has become most commonly translated as truth, 
Heidegger draws on its meaning as unconcealment. Heidegger reminds us that the 
ground of unconcealment lies in concealment and that the two cannot be thought 
independently. Together concealment and unconcealment describe the unfolding of the 
truth of being and thereby is an interpretive feature of phusis. Together aletheia and 
phusis describe the way in which being unfolds in beings that come forth and presence 
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of their own accord. According to Heidegger, these fundamental concepts of Heraclitus‟s 
thought can allow us to understand that the being of beings is never fully exhausted in 
the way it presents itself to our understanding. The essence of being as aletheia 
demonstrates that when we challenge natural entities and the forces of nature to be fully 
present and on hand as the components of the standing energy reserve, we fundamentally 
misinterpret their being and push them outside of their essence. In granting the beings 
that we encounter their self-concealment, we grant them their independence and self-
standing, and in doing so come into an ethical relation with them.  
Being as Logos 
 According to Heidegger, the word logos is another way in which Heraclitus says 
“the Same,” and thereby articulates another essential feature of being. For Heidegger, 
this term describes our essential relation to being and the way in which we come to 
understand ourselves in relation to the world around us. Logos is a notoriously complex 
term and has been translated in many different ways including, reason, law, account, and 
word. Heidegger draws primarily on its association with language and uses this term to 
express how our relation to being allows us interpretively measure our place in existence 
through our meaningful relations with things and others.  
 Heidegger explores this character of being as logos by examining Heraclitus‟s 
Fragment B 50, which reads: “When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning 
[logos], it is wise within the same Meaning to say [legein]: One is All.”138 According to 
Heidegger, legein in this fragment refers to the saying of the thinker, and is the main 
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subject of this fragment. However, Heidegger is not speaking here of Heraclitus alone 
but of all human beings, who in thinking articulate the “One.” Although the word legein 
has commonly been translated as „saying,‟ and indeed held this meaning in the everyday 
usage of the early Greeks, Heidegger tells us that its meaning as saying cannot be 
separated from its meaning as gathering and laying before. Together, these aspects of 
legein should tell us “legein properly means the laying-down and laying-before which 
gathers itself.”139 Thus, for Heidegger, this term expresses the reciprocal relation through 
which human beings gather the meaning of, or interpret, the beings they encounter and 
simultaneously come to interpret their own existence.  
 According to Heidegger, when legein, as gathering, is true to its essential nature, 
it takes its cue from what it seeks to gather. Therefore, in Fragment B 50 gathering 
should be understood as an intentional and selected collection that brings something into 
the shelter of unconcealment. What is gathered in this way and brought to lie before us is 
brought to bear on our concerns and is brought into its proper place. Heidegger 
concludes, legein, in its meaning as laying, “is the letting lie before—which is gathered 
into itself—of that which comes together into presence.”140 For Heidegger, this 
examination of legein provides a fuller understanding of the essence of language. 
Language should now be understood as a gathering that takes its direction from what 
already lies in unconcealment and is “the very presencing of what its present. We call 
this the being of beings.”141  
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 Heidegger makes it clear that we should not misinterpret the gathering of human 
beings as the source of being. Rather, the legein of human beings takes its cue from 
being understood as the logos and is a gathering in which human beings themselves are 
also gathered. In this fragment Heidegger seeks to elucidate the nature of the relation to 
being that occurs in language, which in his “Letter on Humanism” he describes as 
originary ethics, the ground of all ethical comportment. This relation and the way that it 
determines the being of human beings and the world we live in will become clearer if we 
examine what Heidegger seeks to draw from the phrase Hen Panta (One is all). 
 First, Heidegger tells us that we should notice that this fragment speaks not only 
of saying understood as legein but also of listening, which is another important form of 
gathering. We have determined that the essence of saying lies in more than mere 
vocalization. Heidegger argues that, when listening takes its cue from that which it 
gathers, its essence lies in more than the mere sensation of sound. Rather, the essence of 
hearing lies in apprehension, and, as a form of attunement, describes the way in which 
we are gathered before what is unconcealed. According to Heidegger, we only truly hear 
when we belong to the matter addressed, and in belonging to that which gathers us in 
this way, allow what comes to presence to come fully into unconcealment. Heidegger 
describes authentic hearing as hōmolegein, which “lays one and the Same in one.”142 
Together, hōmolegein as attunement and legein as the gathering, which brings what it 
gathers into unconcealment, are the essence of logos. Therefore, Heidegger concludes, 
logos “must be understood as the pure letting-lie together-before of that which of itself 
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comes to lie before us, in its lying there.”143 Heidegger continues that, “If there is to be 
proper hearing, mortals must have already heard the Logos with an attention that implies 
nothing less than their belonging to the Logos.”144 
 According to Heidegger, if we examine this fragment more closely it becomes 
clear that the logos is also a saying. The fragment tells us that the logos addresses human 
beings and says, “Hen panta (one is all).”145 Hen (one) describes the way in which the 
gathering of the logos allows all that is to come forth “as such and as a whole.”146 
However, as we have seen, the legein and hōmolegein of human beings also participate 
in this revealing. In saying one is all the logos describes the way in which being gathers 
and places forth all that is for the gathering of human beings so that they can mindfully 
participate in the unfolding of being, and thereby come to understand themselves and 
build their world.  
 Being, understood as the logos, not only address us in our essence but it also 
addresses us in our everyday dealings with things and others. According to Heidegger, 
the gathering of hōmolegein and the letting lie of legein through which we participate in 
the way the world around us comes into existence occurs today increasingly in the form 
of modern technology. Today, we measure our own essence, our meaningful relations 
and the being of the beings we encounter instrumentally. However, in order to be faithful 
to the logos in our participation with it, Heidegger tells us that “Mortals, whose essence 
remains appropriated in hōmolegein are fateful when they measure the Logos as Hen 
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panta and submit themselves to its measurement.”147 Here, Heidegger tells us that when 
we allow the models of modern science and technology to be the only standards by 
which we conceptually measure ourselves and the world we live in, we are not faithful to 
the logos. Heidegger‟s examination of being understood as logos demonstrates that a 
fuller and more fundamental understanding of human existence comes from the sphere 
of our practical experience and our involvement with the beings we encounter.  
Heidegger‟s examination of the Heraclitean understanding of being as logos 
offers a deeper understanding of the way our essential relation to being occurs in 
language. When we attune ourselves to being through our meaningful relations, we 
gather our understanding of being as it addresses us in the beings we encounter through 
hōmolegein, through mindful involvement with what addresses us. When we allow the 
beings we encounter to come into their own essence, we give expression to being 
understood as logos. Thus, in allowing us to participate in the unfolding of being, the 
essence of language lies in poiesis and provides an essential insight into the ethical 
comportment that Heidegger describes as poetic dwelling. According to Foltz, 
“Heidegger maintains that language is most essentially the kind of „saying‟ that 
constitutes the poetic…such primordial and essential (i.e., poetic) saying is precisely the 
Logos of the early Greeks.”148  
In his exposition of poetic dwelling Heidegger describes the meditative 
involvement with the world we experience which he describes in his Discourse on 
Thinking as an alternative to the theoretical attitude of modern science. While the 
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„calculative thinking‟ that characterizes modern science cannot contemplate “the 
meaning which reigns in everything that is,” meditative involvement allows us to “dwell 
on what lies close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each 
one of us.”149 In his elucidation of thingness, Heidegger describes that which lies closest 
and concerns us in our everyday involvement with the world as „things,‟ the beings we 
encounter in the sphere of our practical experience. Thus, Heidegger‟s examination of 
poetic dwelling can be interpreted as describing the comportment toward the beings we 
encounter that would allow them to take on their full significance within the sphere of 
our practical experience and grants them their independence beyond their ability to 
conform to human purposes. According to Foltz, Heidegger‟s notion of poetic dwelling 
has the potential to restore “a relation to the natural environmental based upon…heedful 
inhabitation” and “is in itself a recovery of the original basis for an environmental ethic: 
a „familiar abode‟ or ēthos.”150  
Poetic Dwelling  
  In his essay, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, Heidegger describes poetic 
dwelling as “staying with things.”151 Thus, in order to come into our essential relation to 
being that would bring us into the proper abode of our dwelling, we must be able to 
interpret the beings we encounter in a way that grants them their self-standing. In 
retrieving the Heraclitean understanding of being as phusis, aletheia, and logos, 
Heidegger provides us with a new interpretive approach to our own existence and the 
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world around us. A shift from interpreting being as constant presence, to an 
interpretation of being of as phusis is simultaneously a shift away from the theoretical 
attitude of modern science and technology which has progressively become the dominate 
framework in which we understand human existence. In his writings on poetic dwelling, 
Heidegger seeks to describe the way in which we come to understand ourselves and the 
world around us when we allow being, as it addresses us in the beings we encounter, to 
be the true measure of our existence.  
In “…Poetically man Dwells…” Heidegger describes poetic dwelling through an 
examination of Friedrich Hölderlin‟s poem, “In Lovely Blueness.” In this essay, 
Heidegger explains that the dwelling space for human beings opens up through 
involvement with the earth and gazing up at the sky. Gazing up at the sky opens up the 
„dimension‟ or horizon of our understanding by allowing us to measure ourselves against 
what remains alien, unknown, and wholly other. Through this measuring, the world 
unfolds for us in the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. Heidegger explains, 
“The taking of measure is what is poetic in dwelling. Poetry is a measuring.”152 Here, we 
must keep in mind that for Heidegger „poetry‟ and „poesy‟ should not be understood as 
solely as a written form of artistic expression. For Heidegger, poetic measure describes 
participation in poiesis, the continual act of allowing the world around us to become 
meaningful to us through our involvement with it. Poetic measure, as the human capacity 
for language, as a saying, characterizes our participation in the logos of phusis. 
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 Human existence in the space opened up for dwelling requires that we “measure” 
our existence through “toiling” on the earth and gazing up at the sky.153 In describing 
dwelling in this way, Heidegger tells us that the authentic abode of human beings opens 
up through our everyday involvement with the world around us and re-contextualizes 
human existence within the sphere of our practical experience. Our involvement with the 
earth must be understood as poetic because it is through our interactions with things and 
others that they are initially, and most essentially, brought before our understanding 
through language. This mode of measurement differs from modern science by paying 
heed to the unfolding of nature rather than expecting it to coincide with preconceived 
rubrics that have been set up prior to our meaningful relations with the world around us.  
 According to Heidegger, poetic dwelling “calls the alien as that to which the 
invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it is—unknown.”154 Through measuring 
against the unknown, which we undertake through our meaningful relations with things 
and others, the poet witnesses the unfolding of nature, for revealing is always an 
interplay between the concealed and the unconcealed, the known and the unknown. 
Poetic measure allows us to encounter nature as more than mere presence at hand, an 
object of use, or a standing reserve of natural resources. Poetry, as poiesis, is a saying 
that gathers and “depicts the coming of that which is unknown into nature.”155 For 
Heidegger, language and thought are essentially linked through poetry; therefore, the 
poetic image allows us to first grasp the unfolding of nature. By preserving what remains 
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unknown and unconcealed in the beings we encounter, poetic measure acknowledges 
that the being of natural existents is not exhausted by our instrumental understanding of 
them, and thereby allows us to relate to them as independent and self-supporting. 
 In his essay “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger tells us, “man dwells in 
that he builds...man is capable of such building only if he already builds in the sense of 
the poetic taking of measure.”156 We attain dwelling through building; however, the 
essence of building lies in more than mere erecting and production. Through another of 
his etymological inquiries, Heidegger tells us that the words „building‟ and „dwelling‟ 
have the same origin in the German word bauen. Therefore, to build means to dwell, and 
this essential link will hold the key to a fuller understanding of what it means to dwell. 
For Heidegger, bauen also means to cherish, protect, preserve and care for, “specifically 
to till the soil and cultivate the vine.”157 Dwelling, as a means of preserving, cultivates 
the presencing of beings and preserves each existent in its own essence. In this way, 
“mortals dwell in that they save the earth...to save really means to set something free 
into its own presencing...saving the earth does not master the earth and does not 
subjugate it.”158 
 Heidegger‟s notion of poetic dwelling can be thought of as an authentic 
participation in the logos of phusis that essentially contrasts with measuring of the 
sciences. In this way, nature comes into our consciousness and authentically presents 
itself as a genuine concern for human beings. When we allow natural existents to assume 
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this significance for us, we allow ourselves to relate to the nonhuman world and the 
natural beings and forces we encounter in a more authentic way. Heidegger describes 
dwelling as a mode of attunement, whereby in listening more carefully to the saying of 
the essence of nature in language, we allow ourselves to come into accord with its 
primordial balance. Dwelling characterizes human existence as it allows itself to come 
into accord with this primordial balance. Heidegger tells us that we have the ability to 
dwell within our grasp; we need only the care and involvement with the beings we 
encounter that would bring us into dwelling. 
 In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger explains that the term bauen also 
means to preserve. For Heidegger, preservation simultaneously means to “save” the 
earth. He tells us that to save something means to “rescue it from ruin,” to free it into its 
own essence, and to bring it under our care.
159
 In this way, Heidegger explains, saving 
the world will be a renewal of the earth. Heidegger tells us the earth that sustains all 
existence withdraws and decays when it is challenged forth as a standing reserve of 
natural resources through the representational model of the sciences and modern 
technology. Dwelling, as saving the earth and granting the beings we encounter their 
independence and self-standing, would allow the nonhuman world to come to into our 
awareness and present itself for the first time as a genuine concern for human beings.  
 In depicting ethical comportment toward the world and the beings we encounter 
this way, Heidegger is not asking that we turn away from modern technology. As we 
saw in chapter three, modern technology is an essential part of human existence and 
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holds the key to restoring our authentic relation to being. When taken together, 
Heidegger‟s analysis of modern technology and his exposition of poetic dwelling 
demonstrate that when we allow the beings we encounter to maintain their independence 
beyond their relevance to human needs and desires, technology can take on the sense of 
Heidegger‟s notion of bauen¸ a building that cooperates with the unfolding of the being 
of beings, rather than challenging them forth solely for the purposes of scientific scrutiny 
and technological use. When we relate to beings in this way, they take on a fuller 
meaning for us as an essential part of our lives and also add depth to our self-
understanding and augment the quality of human existence.  
Conclusion 
As we saw in chapter two, environmental philosophy today depends on and 
responds to an understanding of nature that has its foundation in modern science. If we 
accept Heidegger‟s critique of modern science and technology, it should come as no 
surprise that we still struggle to adequately interpret nature and the basis for a fitting 
relationship with the nonhuman world. Heidegger‟s critique of Western metaphysics, in 
granting us a completely new point of departure for understanding ourselves and our 
place in existence, can contribute to environmental philosophy by shifting the basis of 
our understanding of nature and the foundation of environmental ethics from the sphere 
of modern science to the sphere of our practical experience. Whereas the notions of 
nature and wilderness we encounter in environmental discourse today have a divisive 
character and have promoted a false dichotomy between the human and nonhuman 
world, Heidegger‟s emphasis on the meaning that comes to us through our everyday 
 75 
 
dealings with things and others has the potential to allow the natural environment and 
the beings we encounter therein to become meaningful to us as an essential part of our 
lives. In depicting nature as an essential part of the humanity of human beings, 
Heidegger‟s thought has the potential to promote the development of authentic 
environmental concern. 
Although Heidegger never offer us a definition of nature from outside of the 
framework of modern science and technology, his retrieval of the early Greek notion of 
phusis and his exposition of the poetic character of human existence offer us a new 
perspective that would allow us to reexamine and renegotiate our understanding of the 
nonhuman world. Heidegger describes our relationship with the beings we encounter as 
co-determinative. Understanding our relation to nature in this way makes questions of 
how to balance the rights of humans against the rights of natural forces and entities 
obsolete. Rather, for Heidegger, the foundation of an authentic environmental ethic 
begins with a reexamination of what it means to be human and how our humanity is 
intrinsically linked to our understanding of the world around us. In defining the world 
that we live in through our involvement with things and others, we also come to more 
fully know ourselves. Thus, for Heidegger, and understanding of nature is something 
that will grow and change as our relationship with the world around us also grows and 
changes over time.  
Modern science has made it clear that our current relation to the environment is 
resulting in environmental degradation and has demonstrated the need to fundamentally 
change the way we interact with the world around us. However, we must also examine 
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the underlying worldview that led us to push nature beyond its natural limits. Heidegger 
tells us that, “thinking changes the world.”160 He describes thought as the foundation of 
all action, and subsequently all of our ethical relations. Therefore, environmental ethics 
must begin with an examination how we understand the place of human existence within 
the world around us as well as thoughtful reflection on how we want to determine the 
character of our poetic dwelling upon the earth.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ongoing debate between anthropocentric and biocentric environmentalists 
emerged with the inception of environmental thought in the early1970s and continues to 
underlie the majority of environmental discourse today. This central point of contention 
demonstrates that Anglo-American environmental ethics has yet to define nature in a 
way that would encompass the needs of both human and nonhuman life. As an 
examination of the environmental justice debate demonstrates, the inability to grasp the 
fitting place for human existence within nature has its source in Western metaphysics, 
which lies at the heart of modern science and technology. An examination of the 
wilderness debate demonstrates that the scientific interpretation of nature that dominates 
our understanding today promotes a false dichotomy between nature and human beings 
and thereby contributes to our inability to understand the character of a fitting relation to 
the natural environment. Heidegger‟s critique of Western metaphysics, as I have been at 
labor to suggest, can contribute to environmental thought by deconstructing the 
underlying assumptions that have resulted in our inability to interpret nature and grasp 
the interdependence of human and nonhuman life. His characterization of human 
existence as Dasein demonstrates that the origins of the environmental crisis lie within 
our understanding of human existence and thereby exceed the limits of modern science. 
In shifting the foundations of our understanding of human existence from the sphere of 
modern science to the context of our meaningful relations, Heidegger‟s thought clears 
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the way for a fuller encounter with the natural environment and thereby promotes the 
development of authentic environmental concern.  
 Much further analysis needs to be done to develop the insights won through the 
analysis of this thesis. If we reexamine the environmental justice debate within an 
understanding of the poetic character of Dasein, we may find that the antinomy between 
anthropocentric and biocentric environmentalism may be dissolved and require a radical 
new beginning. In overcoming the false dichotomy that determines our understanding of 
nature today, Heidegger‟s thought has the potential to change our fundamental approach 
to environmental ethics. Heidegger argues that a deconstruction of Western metaphysics 
would allow us:  
Finally to realize that precisely through the characterization of something as „a 
value,‟ what is so valued is robbed of its worth… Every valuing, even where it 
values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing 
lets beings: be valid—solely as the objects of its doing.161  
 
Thus, a Heideggerian approach would not seek to establish an authentic environmental 
ethic from out of preconceived directives for action. Rather, in approaching ethics 
ontologically, Heidegger‟s thought has the potential to clear the way for authentic 
reflection on the fitting place of human existence within the natural environment.  
 
                                                 
161
 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 251. 
 79 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Brown, Charles S. and Ted Toadvine, “An Introduction to Eco-Phenomenology,” in 
Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself,” edited by Charles S. Brown and 
Ted Toadvine, ix-xxi. Albany, NY: Sate University of New York Press, 2003. 
 
Callicott, J. Baird. In Defense of the Land Ethic. Albany, NY: State University of New  
York, 1989. 
 
———. “Nonanthropocentric Value Theory and Environmetnal Ethics.” American  
 Philosophical Quarterly 21 no 4. (1984) 299-309.  
 
Cronon, William. “Humanist Environmentalism: A Manifesto.” Lecture for the Lynn W.  
Day Distinguished Lecturship in Forest and Conservation History. Duke 
University, Durham, NC, 1999. 
 
———. “In Search of Nature.” In Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in  
Nature, edited by William Cronon, 23-68. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1996. 
 
———. “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.” In  
Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, edited by William 
Cronon, 69-90. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996. 
 
DeLuca, Kevin. “A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite  
Self-Absorption of Humans.” In Environmental Justice and Environmetnalism: 
The Social Justice Challenge to Environmetnalism, edited by Ronald Sandler and 
Phaedra C. Pezzullo, 27-56. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007. 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert. “Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology.” In Readings in 
the Philosophy of Technology, edited by David Kaplan, 53-63. Lanham, MD: 
Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 
 
Edwards, James C. “The Thinging of the Thing: The Ethic of Conditionality in  
Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, 456-467. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing    
Ltd., 2004. 
 
Foltz, Bruce V. Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the  
Metaphysics of Nature. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1995. 
 
———. “On Heidegger and the Interpretation of Environmental Crisis.” Environmental  
Ethics 6 (1984): 323-338. 
 
 80 
 
Foltz, Bruce V., and Robert Frodeman. “The Nature of Environmental Philosophy.” In  
Rethinking Nature, edited by Bruce V. Foltz and Robert Frodeman, 1-9.  
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
 
Glazebrook, Trish. “From Phusis to Nature, Techne to Technology: Aristotle, Galileo,  
and Newton.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2000): 95-118. 
 
Hargrove, Eugene. The Foundations of Enviornmental Ethics. Denton, TX:  
Environmental Ethics Books, 1989. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. “...Poetically Man Dwells...” In Poetry Language Thought, edited by  
J. Glenn Gray, translated by Albert Hofstadter, 211-232. New York, NY: Harper  
Colopholon, 1975. 
 
———. “Aletheia (Heracliuts, Fragment B 16).” In Early Greek Thinking, translated  
by David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, 102-123. New York, NY: Harper  
& Row Publishers Inc., 1984. 
 
———. Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. New York: State Unviersity of  
New York Press, 2010. 
 
———. “Building Dwelling Thinking.” In Poetry Language Thought, edited by J. Glenn  
Gray, translated by Albert Hofstadter, 143-162. New York, NY: Harper 
Colopholon, 1975. 
 
———. “Letter on Humanism.” In Basic Writings, edited by David Farell Krell, 213- 
265. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher, 1993. 
 
———. “Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50).” In Early Greek Thinking, translated by  
David Farell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, 59-78. New York, NY: Harper & Row 
Publishers Inc., 1984. 
 
———. “Memorial Address,” in Discourse on Thinking, translated by John M.  
Anderson and E. Hans Freund, 43-57. New York, NY: Harper & Row 
Publishers., 1966. 
 
———. “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics.” In Basic Writings, edited by  
David Farrell Krell, 267-3067. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993. 
 
———. “On the Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle's Physics BI.” In  
Pathmarks, translated by Thomas Sheehan, 183-230. Cambridge: The Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1998. 
 
———. “Science and Reflection.” In The Question Concerning Technology and Other  
 81 
 
Essays, edited by J. Glenn Gray and Joan Stambaugh, 156-184. New York, NY: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1977. 
 
———. “The Question Concerning Technology.” In Basic Writings, edited by David  
Ferell Krell, 307-341. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993. 
 
———. “The Thing.” In Poetically Man Dwells, edited by J Glenn Gray, translated by  
Albert Hofstadter, 163-186. New York, NY: Harper Colopholon, 1975. 
 
Langer, Monika “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty: Some of their Contributions 
and Limitations for Environmentalism” in Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the 
Earth Itself,” edited by Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine, 103-120. Albany, 
NY: Sate University of New York Press, 2003. 
 
Nancy, Jean-Luc. “Heidegger's Originary Ethics.” Studies in Practical Philosophy: A  
Journal of Ethical and Political Philosophy, 1999: 13-35. 
 
Sandler, Ronald, and Phaedra C. Pezzullo. “Revisting the Environmental Justice  
Challenge to Environmentalism.” In Environmental Justice and 
Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to Environmentalism, edited by 
Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C. Pezzullo, 1-23. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2007. 
 
Schlosberg, David. “Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a  
Discourse.” Environmental Politics 22 (2013): 37-54. 
 
Sheehan, Thomas. “Dasein.” In A Companion to Heidegger, edited by Hubert L. Dreufus  
and Mark A. Wrathall, 193-213. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007. 
 
Thiele, Leslie Paul. “Nature and Freeedom: A Heideggerian Critique of Biocentric and  
Sociocentric Environmentalism.” Environmental Ethics 17.2 (1995): 171-190. 
 
Zimmerman, Michael E. “Heidegger's Philosophy and Contemporary  
Environmentalism.” In Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself, 73-102. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003. 
 
———. “Toward a Heideggerian Ethos for Radical Environmentalism.” Environmental  
Ethics 5 (1983): 99-131. 
